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ABSTRACT 
Firms depend on information technology to provide high quality internal information, but 
prior research suggests that IT is underutilized (Venkatesh and Bala 2008).  Therefore, using a 
sample of firms with equivalent levels of technology in their information systems, I investigate 
whether firms that employ CEOs with IT expertise make forecasts that are more accurate.  I 
argue that CEOs with IT expertise are more likely to encourage the utilization of IT in making 
earnings forecasts, thus increasing the accuracy of the forecasts.  This argument is supported by 
prior research that suggests that people are more likely to utilize technology if they have more 
experience with IT (Venkatesh et al. 2012).  This research suggests that executives with IT 
experience are more likely to utilize IT because they perceive it as easy to use.  Overall, I find 
that CEOs with IT expertise make forecasts that are more accurate.   In additional tests, I also 
find that CEOs with IT expertise do not manage earnings to maintain accuracy.  Finally, I find 
that analysts are more likely to rely on information provided by CEOs with IT expertise.  
Additionally, analysts benefit from the high quality information provided by CEOs with IT 
expertise because analysts that revise their forecasts following a forecast issued by a CEO with 
IT expertise make forecasts that are more accurate. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 Managers rely on their information systems to provide information for internal decisions 
and external financial reporting.  Following Dorantes et al. (2013), I refer to this flow of 
information to the manager as the internal information environment.  A high quality internal 
information environment is one in which managers can access an abundance of accurate 
information from a variety of business processes in a timely fashion.  Extant literature finds that 
effective information technology (IT) is the foundation of a high quality internal information 
environment (Li et al. 2012; Dorantes et al. 2013). Recent surveys of corporate directors 
document that firms recognize the importance of IT.  However, these directors also admit that 
the majority of their firms lack adequate IT expertise to utilize IT effectively (KPMG 2012; PwC 
2012).  Therefore, I examine whether firms that employ a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) with 
IT expertise maintain a higher quality internal information environment, as evidenced through 
management earnings forecast accuracy. 
Firms depend on IT for timely and accurate information for decision-making.  For this 
reason, most publicly traded firms use some type of integrative IT, such as an enterprise system1, 
to capture accounting and non-accounting information flows (Leib 2002; Brazel and Dang 2008; 
Cullinan et al. 2010).  Prior research finds that implementing new IT improves the internal 
information environment (Dorantes et al. 2013), as evidenced by more accurate earnings 
forecasts issued by managers (hereafter referred to as management forecasts). Further evidence 
suggests that firms experience operational benefits from IT (Dehning and Richardson 2002; 
                                                 
1 Enterprise systems are a general type of IT commonly used by firms.  Firms use these systems 
to integrate and automate business processes.  They are used to connect processes within one 
organization or across multiple organizations.  Firms use these systems to produce information 
used in operational and financial reporting decisions (Hitt et al. 2002; Sia et al. 2002; Dorantes et 
al. 2013). 
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Dehning et al. 2003; Kobelsky et al. 2008); however, the literature also suggests that firms 
underutilize IT leading to poorer than expected outcomes (Venkatesh and Bala 2008).   
A stream of research investigates why people choose not to adopt and utilize new IT 
(Venkatesh 2000; Venkatesh et al. 2003).  Extant research shows that a primary reason managers 
are reluctant to adopt and utilize new technology is a lack of experience with IT (Armstrong and 
Sambamurthy 1999; Venkatesh 2000; Bassellier et al. 2003; Venkatesh et al. 2003; Venkatesh et 
al. 2012).  Based on the evidence from these prior studies, and given that most firms have 
implemented technology based information systems, CEOs with IT expertise should be more 
likely to encourage the adoption, implementation, and utilization of those systems (Armstrong 
and Sambamurthy 1999; Venkatesh 2000; Bassellier et al. 2003; Venkatesh et al. 2003; 
Venkatesh et al. 2012). Therefore IT experience among executives may be beneficial to firms 
seeking to improve their internal information environment, because IT utilization should improve 
information flows.   
   Managers make earnings forecasts using both accounting and non-accounting 
information provided by the firm’s information systems.  Therefore, the accuracy of management 
forecasts are an external signal of the quality of the internal information environment.    
According to disclosure theory, when managers have access to better internal information they 
will make voluntary disclosures, such as earnings forecasts, to reduce agency costs and to signal 
their abilities (Trueman 1986; Verrecchia 1990).  However, since managers face consequences 
for making poor quality forecasts they may choose to make less specific or fewer forecasts if 
their firm has a low quality internal information environment (Graham et al. 2005; Feng et al. 
2009).  Given their willingness to utilize IT, CEOs with IT expertise should be able to produce 
an internal information environment that allows them to make higher quality earnings forecasts. 
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I examine whether CEOs with IT expertise foster stronger internal information 
environments as evidenced by management forecasts that are more accurate than those made by 
other CEOs.  Using biographies for CEOs from S&P 1500 firms, I construct a measure of IT 
expertise similar to Li et al. (2007), Haislip et al. (2013), and Lim et al. (2013).  I develop this 
measure using information from the CEOs’ work and educational backgrounds.2  I argue that 
CEOs develop an expertise with IT through experience working in IT related positions and/or 
training associated with a degree in an IT related field.  This expertise should affect the CEOs 
strategic priorities regarding IT, and increase their willingness to utilize IT.  I predict that their 
experience with IT fosters a culture in which the use of IT is encouraged, which will also 
improve the quality of the information environment and the accuracy of management forecasts. 
Despite the benefits of CEO IT expertise, obtaining such expertise is not costless.  There 
are undoubtedly opportunity costs associated with gaining IT expertise.  For example, a CEO 
that previously served as a Chief Information Officer (CIO) likely will not have the financial 
reporting expertise a CEO that served as a Chief Financial Officer has.  Therefore, the CEO with 
IT expertise in this example would lack financial reporting expertise (Krishnan 2005; Krishnan 
and Visvanathan 2008).   It is unclear whether the benefits from IT expertise outweigh the 
opportunity costs of lacking other skills; however, IT is a key factor in an effective internal 
information environment (Masli et al. 2010; Dorantes et al. 2013; Li et al. 2012) and therefore is 
potentially an area where IT expertise provides the greatest benefit.   
                                                 
2 A more thorough discussion of the sample selection process and development of the IT 
expertise measure appear in the research design section. 
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I apply my measure of CEO IT expertise to a sample of 16,8993 annual4 forecasts made 
by S&P 1500 firms.  I find that CEOs with IT expertise make forecasts that are more accurate.  
This is consistent with my prediction that their willingness to utilize IT improves the internal 
information environment allowing them to make forecasts that are more accurate.  These results 
hold when I include a control variable for the financial expertise of the CEO.  I find no 
association between forecast accuracy and CEO financial expertise, suggesting that in this 
particular setting IT expertise is more valuable.  Additionally, I find that CEOs with IT expertise 
maintain an accuracy advantage regardless of the forecast horizon.  For each firm’s fiscal year I 
examine their first forecast, their final forecast, and the average forecast error for the year, and 
find that CEOs with IT expertise consistently make forecasts that are more accurate.  
Additionally, I find that CEOs with IT expertise do not differ from other CEOs for other forecast 
characteristics, such as frequency, precision, or bias.  This suggests that CEOs with IT expertise 
do not achieve their accuracy through imprecise forecasts and are not subject to biases.   
An alternative explanation of the greater forecast accuracy is that these CEOs are 
managing earnings to meet their forecasts.  It is possible that CEOs with IT expertise may be 
more prone to this because as Lynch and Gomaa (2003) suggest, managers may be able to use IT 
to engage in fraudulent activity.  To rule out this explanation, I test whether CEOs with IT 
expertise are associated with indicators of earnings management.  I find that CEOs with IT 
expertise are not more likely to engage in earnings management activities.  Specifically, I find no 
association between CEO IT expertise and the likelihood to just meet or beat their forecast using 
                                                 
3 I additionally use a matched control sample in which I match each treatment forecast with a 
control forecast based on year, industry, firm size, forecast horizon, and forecast difficulty.  
Further discussion of this appears in the research design and results sections.    
4 I additionally test my hypotheses utilizing quarterly forecasts and arrive at similar results.  See 
the additional analysis section for further discussion of this test.  
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discretionary accruals.  Additionally, I find that CEOs with IT expertise are associated with 
fewer financial misstatements.  This provides evidence that the IT expertise of the CEO 
improves the internal information environment as opposed to increasing their propensity to 
manage earnings.   
In other tests, I also find that analysts are more likely to rely on management forecasts 
issued by CEOs with IT expertise.  I specifically find that analysts are more likely to revise their 
forecasts following a management forecast if that management forecast is made by a CEO with 
IT expertise.  I also find that analysts revise their forecasts to a greater degree following forecasts 
made by CEOs with IT expertise.  Finally, I find that these analyst revisions are more accurate 
than other analyst forecasts.  These results suggest that forecasts made by CEOs with IT 
expertise provide high quality information in their forecasts that analysts benefit from.  Overall, 
the results show that CEOs with IT expertise foster high quality information environments for 
both internal and external users.   
 This paper contributes to the ongoing stream of research examining the relationship 
between IT and the internal information environment.  For example, some recent studies find that 
IT improves financial reporting quality for firms that implement IT related to internal controls 
over financial reporting, and specific financial reporting technology, such as eXtensible Business 
Reporting Language (XBRL) (Hodge et al. 2004; Hunton et al. 2008; Masli et al. 2010).  In 
addition, Dorantes et al. (2013) and Li et al. (2012) show that IT improves the quality of 
management forecasts.  My study differs from these in that I examine the IT expertise of the 
CEO, as opposed to the effect of the specific IT itself.  If the implementation of IT improves the 
internal information environment, then a CEO who is more willing to fully utilize the IT should 
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maximize the quality of the internal information environment.  I specifically provide evidence 
documenting the positive effect of CEO IT expertise on management forecast accuracy.   
 My study also contributes to the growing literature investigating the positive effects of 
CEO IT expertise.  Li et al. (2007) and Haislip et al. (2013) examine the ability of CEOs with IT 
expertise to remediate material weaknesses in internal controls.  In addition, Lim et al. (2013) 
show that CEOs with IT expertise can improve the reputation of a firm.  My study complements 
these prior studies by examining how CEO IT expertise improves the internal information 
environment.  These improvements to the internal information environment can affect many 
aspects of a firm such as financial reporting quality and day-to-day operational decisions. 
 Finally, my study contributes to the management forecast disclosure literature.  Most 
prior studies regarding management forecast quality focus on the incentives CEOs face when 
making their forecasts, such as avoiding litigation and strategically altering stock prices (Kaznik 
and Lev 1995; Cotter et al. 2006).  However, few papers examine the abilities of the CEOs 
making the forecasts.  Baik et al. (2011) find that CEOs with better managing abilities (using 
measures such as press citations and industry-adjusted return on assets) make forecasts that are 
more accurate.  My study extends this research by examining a specific CEO attribute that 
improves the overall information environment for the firm thus improving the quality of earnings 
forecasts. 
 I organize the remainder of the paper as follows.  First, I develop my hypothesis, which 
includes a review of the IT acceptance and information quality literature.  Second, I describe my 
sample and research design.  Finally, I discuss the results and provide a conclusion to the study. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 IT Acceptance and the Internal Information Environment 
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 Essentially all large public firms have adopted some form of enterprise system or some 
other integrative IT system to improve the responsiveness of their internal information systems 
(Leib 2002; Brazel and Dang 2008; Cullinan et al. 2010).  Overall, the evidence suggests that the 
implementation of IT improves the internal information environment.  For example, Brazel and 
Dang (2008), find that after implementing an enterprise resource planning system, firms reduce 
the time between their fiscal year end and earnings announcement date.  The authors attribute 
this to enterprise systems providing real-time financial information from multiple accounting 
cycles and departments, therefore improving the timeliness of information.  In addition, Masli et 
al. (2010) find that implementing IT specifically aimed at monitoring the effectiveness of 
internal controls decreases the likelihood of material weaknesses and improves the financial 
reporting lag, again suggesting that IT improves the quality and timeliness of information.  
Complementing these studies, Li et al. (2012) find that when IT is not working properly, there 
are detrimental effects on the information environment.  Specifically they find that firms that 
report IT related material weaknesses in internal controls also make less accurate earnings 
forecasts, suggesting that the information used by the CEO making the forecast is poor in 
quality.  Finally, Dorantes et al. (2013) find that implementing an enterprise system improves the 
accuracy of management forecasts.  The authors attribute the improved accuracy to an improved 
information environment created by the enterprise system.  Overall, the extant literature suggests 
that properly functioning IT improves the internal information environment.  However, as the 
literature also suggests, simply implementing IT is not enough, but that actual utilization of the 
system leads to success (Rai et al. 2002). 
 Not every IT implementation occurs with resounding success.  In 2000, Nike lost $100 
million in sales and faced a 20% drop in stock price due to a failed IT implementation (Koch 
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2004).  Similarly, in 2004 Hewlett-Packard (HP) lost $40 million in sales on a $30 million failed 
IT implementation (Koch 2007).  While these are extreme examples of what can go wrong, the 
returns associated with implementing new IT are often less than expected (Devaraj and Kohli 
2003; Venkatesh and Bala 2008).  As noted by Venkatesh and Bala (2008), possible causes of 
this result are low adoption and underutilization of the new IT.  Executives often view IT as a 
commodity that they purchase for their business to stay competitive, but believe that no further 
attention is required from them following the purchase (Koch 2007).  However, when upper 
management neglects IT, it can create massive problems for the firm, or at best the firm will 
never realize the full benefits of the IT (Rai et al. 2002; Venkatesh and Bala 2008; Haislip et al. 
2013).  Therefore, firms face potential benefits if they can utilize IT to its full potential. 
 A stream of information systems literature investigates what affects a person’s 
willingness to adopt and utilize new IT (Venkatesh 2000; Venkatesh et al. 2003; Venkatesh and 
Bala 2008; Brown et al. 2012; Venkatesh et al. 2012).  Bedard et al. (2003) apply a similar 
approach in their study where they investigate auditors’ willingness to utilize an electronic work 
paper system.  The authors of these papers find that the two main factors that affect a person’s 
willingness to accept new technology are the perceived ease of use and the perceived usefulness 
of the technology.  Essentially a person is more willing to use a technology if they believe they 
will understand how to use it and/or they believe that it is useful.  Recent work finds that past 
experience with IT increases the perceived ease of use (Venkatesh 2000; Bedard et al. 2003; 
Venkatesh et al. 2003; Venkatesh et al. 2012).  Additionally, the combination of experience and 
perceived ease of use have a positive effect on perceived usefulness.  Therefore, a person with 
experience working with IT perceives new IT as easier to work with and this in turn gives them a 
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better appreciation of how useful it is.  This shows that experience is an effective contributing 
factor to a person’s willingness to adopt and utilize IT.  
 The fact that a CEO with more IT expertise is more likely to use IT is not in itself enough 
to improve a firm’s information environment.  However, when that IT expertise affects the entire 
organization there should be benefits to the overall information environment.  First, a CEO with 
IT expertise is more likely to be involved in the process of procuring new IT (Jarvenpaa and Ives 
1991; Bassellier et al. 2003).  The CEO’s involvement will likely aid the company in acquiring 
the IT that most aligns with the firm’s strategic priorities (Jarvenpaa and Ives 1991; Thong and 
Yap 1995; Armstrong and Sambamurthy 1999).  For example, as stated before, the majority of 
large public companies utilize some type of ERP system.  However, these ERP systems are 
comprised of multiple modules (such as human resource, inventory, purchase, finance & 
accounting, customer relationship management, and supply chain management).  Therefore the 
firm is able to choose which modules best fit with their organization.  A CEO with IT expertise 
will most likely be more involved in this process and choose the modules that will best improve 
the information environment (Jarvenpaa and Ives 1991; Thong and Yap 1995; Armstrong and 
Sambamurthy 1999).   
 In addition to choosing the IT that their firms will implement, CEOs with IT expertise 
can also influence the degree to which IT is actually used throughout the firm.  Hunton et al. 
(2011) find that the tone set by the CEO affects how rigorously controls are implemented and 
tested throughout the firm.  Similarly, other papers show that the values and preferences of the 
CEO affect the decisions made by employees made throughout the firm (Wally and Baum 1994; 
Berson et al. 2008).  More relevant to this study, many papers show that when the CEO has some 
degree of IT knowledge or supports the implementation of IT, then the IT is more likely to be 
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accepted throughout the firm (Thong and Yap 1995; Bassellier et al. 2003; Li 2005; Finney and 
Corbett 2007).  Overall, the evidence suggests that CEOs are able to influence the degree to 
which IT is accepted within their firm.   
 In summary, prior research suggests that implementing new IT positively affects the 
internal information environment by providing more information from throughout the firm in a 
timely and accurate fashion.  As shown by Dorantes et al. (2013), a quality information 
environment improves the quality of management forecasts.  However, prior research also shows 
that firms do not usually experience the full benefits of IT due to a lack of utilization.  As shown 
by prior research, experience with IT increases a person’s willingness to utilize IT.  Therefore, it 
logically follows that CEOs with IT expertise are more willing to utilize IT than other CEOs. In 
agreement with this prediction, Bassellier et al. (2003) find that CEOs with a better 
understanding of IT are more likely to implement and encourage the use of IT. This allows them 
to extract superior information creating an improved internal information environment.  In the 
following section, I examine the linkages between CEO IT expertise and a distinct output of the 
internal information environment, specifically management forecasts. 
2.2 The Information Environment and Management Forecasts 
 According to disclosure theory, managers have incentives to provide voluntary 
disclosures as they receive better internal information.  These incentives involve either reducing 
agency costs or signaling their own abilities to manage the firm and provide quality information 
(Diamond 1985; Trueman 1986; Verrecchia 1990; Coller and Yohn 1997; Graham et al. 2005).     
One form of voluntary disclosure is management forecasts.  Diamond (1985) argues that a 
primary reason that managers choose to release internal information is to reduce the cost 
shareholders face in acquiring private information.  Prior literature finds that management 
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forecasts influence stock prices and analyst forecasts, suggesting that investors and analysts do 
rely on management forecasts (Patell 1976; Penman 1980; Pownall and Waymire 1980; 
Waymire 1984; Waymire 1986; Jennings 1987; Baginski and Hassell 1990; Williams 1996).  
Complementing these studies, Trueman (1986) argues that managers use earnings forecasts to 
signal their own superior abilities to manage the firm.  Trueman goes on to state that this 
decision to release internal earnings forecasts is dependent on the quality of the internal 
information used by the CEO.  Verrechia (1990) explores this further by suggesting that when 
the quality of the internal information increases, managers will make more voluntary disclosures.   
There is also evidence supporting the notion that executives are hesitant to release forecasts and 
that forecasts are less specific when managers only have access to low quality internal 
information (Feng et al. 2009).  This is most likely because managers are concerned about their 
reputations for making quality forecasts (Graham et al. 2005).  Additionally, managers 
potentially face stock market and labor market penalties when they release poor quality forecasts 
(Lee et al. 2012), thus justifying their hesitance in making earnings forecasts based on low 
quality information.  Overall, the evidence suggests that managers want to make forecasts that 
are accurate, and thus desire to obtain access to the highest quality internal information possible. 
 As mentioned, the two primary reasons for issuing management forecasts are to mitigate 
information asymmetry and to provide a signal about management’s ability.  Healy and Palepu 
(2001) argue that the extent to which managers are able to achieve either of these goals is largely 
dependent on the accuracy of their earnings forecasts.  The extant literature focuses on how the 
quality of the inputs affects the accuracy of forecasts.  For example, Feng et al. (2009) and Li et 
al. (2012) find that material weaknesses in internal control are negatively associated with 
management forecast accuracy, suggesting that these weaknesses negatively affect the 
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informational inputs used by management to make forecasts.  Additional research finds that 
CEOs develop forecasting reputations (Ng et al. 2013) and that CEOs with better managing 
abilities make more accurate forecasts (Baik et al. 2011). However, the extant literature does not 
examine any other abilities of CEOs that could improve the quality of information inputs to 
improve earnings forecasts. 
 I argue that management forecasts depend on both the quality of the internal information 
used by managers and the ability of the manager to interpret and use that information.  IT 
expertise should enhance a CEO’s ability to extract more information and to interpret the 
information more fully, and therefore CEOs with IT expertise should be able to make more 
accurate earnings forecasts.  A CEO with IT expertise should be able to obtain more accurate, 
timely, and precise internal information that will allow them to make earnings forecasts that are 
more accurate.  Based on disclosure theory and the improvements to the internal information 
environment provided by CEO IT expertise, my hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis:  CEOs with IT expertise make higher quality management forecasts, as 
measured by forecast accuracy, than CEOs without IT expertise. 
 
3.  RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.1 Sample Selection 
 My initial sample includes annual management forecasts (obtained from First Call) for 
S&P 1500 firms from 2004 through 2010.  Following prior literature I exclude financial services 
and utility firms (SIC codes 4900-4999 and 6000-6999) because these firms are highly regulated 
and their disclosure polices differ from other firms (Karamanou and Vafeas 2005).  I begin the 
sample period in 2004 because I use data from SOX 404 internal control reports to construct 
some of the control variables.  My sample is limited to S&P 1500 firms because I want to limit 
the sample to firms with some type of integrative IT implemented in their information system.  
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Based on prior literature and anecdotal evidence essentially all large public firms utilize some 
type of enterprise system within their firm (Leib 2002; Brazel and Dang 2008; Cullinan et al. 
2010).  Therefore, for my sample it is not the decision to implement the system that affects the 
quality of the forecasts because all of the firms in the sample utilize some type of enterprise 
system.  I finally also eliminate any firms that are missing the data necessary (obtained from 
Computstat, CRSP, and Audit Analytics) to calculate the variables used in my models.  After 
applying these requirements my sample includes 16,899 individual annual forecasts from 3,529 
firm-year observations.5,6  Panel A of Table 1 presents a reconciliation of my sample.  I 
additionally use a matched sample design in which I match each CEO IT expertise forecast with 
a control forecast from the same industry and year.  I make the matches with the requirements 
that LnAT must be within 30% and that the horizon of the forecast is within 90 days.  Finally, 
after I identify potential matches that meet these criteria I match the treatment forecast to the 
control forecast with the closest Std_AF, as this is a proxy for forecast difficulty (Ajinkya et al. 
2005).  This yields a sample of 900 forecasts, 450 of which are forecasts issued by CEOs with IT 
expertise.7   
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
                                                 
5 One of my variables, Std_AF, requires the firm to be followed by multiple analysts.  This 
variable is responsible for the largest reduction in my sample size.  In untabulated results, I run 
my models excluding this variable on the larger sample and arrive at similar results. 
6 I match each forecast with the CEO that issued the forecast based on the data of the forecast 
and the dates the CEO was in office.  In years of turnover, the new CEO may make operational 
decisions that affect the quality of the initial CEO’s forecast.  Therefore in untabulated results I 
run my analysis removing forecasts made in years of CEO turnover and arrive at similar results.  
I alternatively include an indicator variable for CEO turnover and also arrive at similar results.   
7 In untabulated results, I also run all of the models winsorizing all continuous variables at the 
99% and 1% levels to mitigate the effects of outliers.  I arrive at similar results to those presented 
in the tables. 
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 I measure CEO IT expertise similar to Li et al. (2007), Haislip et al. (2013), and Lim et 
al. (2013).  To identify potential IT expertise I read the biographies of the CEOs found using the 
Corporate Library, BusinessWeek, and Forbes.  There are two potential ways that a CEO that can 
be considered to have IT expertise.  First, if the executive has a graduate level academic degree8 
that is IT related which includes degrees in Computer Sciences, Electrical Engineering, or 
Information Systems.  The second potential method for acquiring IT expertise is through 
working in an IT-related position of employment.  The IT-related jobs identified in my sample 
are: Chief Information Officer, Chief Technology Officer, Vice President of Information 
Technology, or IT Consultant.9  If the CEO meets either of these criteria then they are considered 
to possess IT expertise and I code the IT Expert variable as a one.  Either working in an IT 
position or acquiring a graduate level degree should provide the CEO with enough experience to 
be comfortable working with IT.10  Panel B of Table 1 provides the distribution of the sample 
across time. The distribution of the sample is fairly even through time, with a slight increasing 
trend within the IT expertise firms, which is in line with recent surveys suggesting that firms are 
increasingly recognizing the importance of IT (KPMG 2012; PWC 2012).  Panel C of Table 1 
provides an industry distribution of the sample.  It appears that overall firms are distributed 
similarly between the treatment and control groups, with a slightly larger percentage of CEOs 
                                                 
8 The results remain essentially the same if I include undergraduate degrees in this measure. 
9 In additional analysis I control for the presence of a CIO within the organization.  I find that 
this variable is not significant and does not affect the results presented.  See the additional 
analysis section for further discussion of this test. 
10 Li et al. (2007), Haislip et al. (2013), and Lim et al. (2013) additionally use a third criteria in 
which they consider a CEO to possess IT expertise if they work for an IT firm.  I do not include 
this measurement because these CEOs tend to remain at IT companies and therefore it is unclear 
if the effects are from the IT expertise or an industry effect.  I choose to limit IT expertise to the 
two criteria I use because it is a clearer measure is this situation. 
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with IT expertise working in services firms.11  Table 2 provides definitions for all other variables 
used throughout the paper.  Finally, Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for all of the firms in 
the sample.  As expected, since my sample only includes S&P 1500 firms, the firms in the 
sample are large, profitable firms that tend to use Big 4 auditors and these firms tend not to be 
overly leveraged.  Also of note, more than 3% of the firms in the sample employ a CEO with IT 
expertise.   
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
3.2 Model Specifications 
 To examine the potential impact that CEO IT expertise has on the internal information 
environment, I investigate whether CEO IT expertise affects the accuracy of management 
forecasts.  I use management forecasts because they are an external signal of the quality of the 
internal information environment.  I therefore use the following OLS regression model to test my 
Hypothesis (see table 2 for variable definitions): 
Abs_Errorj,i,t = β0 + β1IT Expertj,i,t + β2LnATi,t + β3ROAi,t + β4Lossi,t + β5Leveragei,t + 
β6EarnVoli,t + β7CFOVoli,t + β8Growthi,t + β9IndConi,t + β10Big4i,t + 
β11LnAnalystsi,t + β12Std_AFj,i,t + β13Surprisej,i,t + β14Horizonj,i,t + 
β15Litigationi,t +  β16High Techi,t + β17Weaki,t  + εj,i,t                       (1) 
 
For this model, I include year fixed effects and estimate robust standard errors clustered by 
firm12 following Petersen (2009).  I measure the variables, depending on their nature, for forecast 
j, of firm i, in year t.  Abs_Error is the absolute value of management forecast error, measured as 
realized earnings less the management forecast, scaled by the closing stock price on the last day 
                                                 
11 The results of my empirical tests remain essentially the same if I include industry indicator 
variables in the models. 
12 The results remain essentially unchanged if I alternatively cluster standard errors by CEO or 
dual clustering by firm and year. 
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of the previous fiscal year.  Therefore, a larger number is an indicator of greater error and less 
accurate forecasts. 
 My variable of interest is IT Expert and I describe the measurement of this variable in the 
previous section.  I expect CEOs with IT expertise to make forecasts that are more accurate than 
other CEOs.  Therefore, consistent with my hypothesis that CEO IT expertise improves the 
internal information environment, I expect the coefficient on IT Expert (β1) to be negative and 
significant, signifying lower forecast errors.  I initially run this model at the individual forecast 
level, and therefore when appropriate I measure the variables at the forecast level.  As discussed 
earlier, a CEO that acquires IT expertise is most likely sacrificing an opportunity to gain another 
type of expertise.  Therefore, I additionally run the model including a variable to control for the 
financial expertise of the CEO, Financial Exp.  This alternative model should provide evidence 
as to the true strategic benefits of IT expertise as it applies to the firm’s internal information 
environment.  To alleviate concerns that firms that employ CEOs with IT expertise are simply 
inherently different from other firms, and that these other differences could cause the improved 
management forecasts, I additionally utilize a matched control group sample.  I match each of 
the forecasts made by CEOs with IT expertise with a control forecast within the same industry-
year based on size, forecast horizon, and forecast difficulty.  Therefore, the primary difference 
between the treatment and control observations is the IT expertise of the CEO.  I again run the 
same model (Model 1), to measure forecast accuracy using this matched sample. 
 I follow prior literature by including additional independent variables to control for other 
possible determinants of management forecast quality.  Definitions of all variables are in Table 
2.  Larger firms have more experienced and knowledgeable staff and therefore I expect firm size 
(LnAT) to be positively associated with management forecast quality (Kasznik and Lev 1995).  
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Baik et al. (2011) find that executives with better operations performance make higher quality 
forecasts and therefore I include the return on assets (ROA).  Hayn (1995) find that earnings of 
firms that report losses are less informative than profitable firms.  Therefore, extant literature 
predicts and finds a negative relationship between Loss firms and the quality of management 
forecasts (Ajinkya et al. 2005; Baik et al. 2011).  Similarly, Feng et al. (2009) find that firms 
facing financial challenges make forecasts that are of lower quality.  Therefore, I include both 
Loss and Leverage in my model.  Firms with highly volatile earnings face greater difficulty in 
forecasting future earnings (Feng et al. 2009; Dorantes et al. 2013).  Therefore, I include 
EarnVol and CFOVol to control for any effects of this volatility.  Feng et al. (2009) additionally 
find that sales Growth can negatively affect the quality of earnings forecasts.  Firms that operate 
in industries with low competitive pressures face different incentives for disclosures than firms 
within highly competitive industries (Bamber and Cheon 1998).  I therefore include IndCon 
(measured using the Herfindahl index), to control for the effects of industry concentration on 
earnings forecasts.  Prior research also documents that firms that engage Big4 auditors tend to 
have higher quality disclosures and more accurate earnings forecasts (Lang and Lundholm 1993; 
Ajinkya et al. 2005; Feng et al. 2009).  Prior research finds a similar positive affect on 
disclosures for firms with large analyst following, thus I include LnAnalysts (Lang and 
Lundholm 1996).  Prior literature uses the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts (Std_AF) to capture 
the uncertainty of earnings prospects for a firm (Ajinkya and Gift 1984; Brown et al. 1985; 
Swaminathan 1991).  Recent literature applies this measurement to proxy for the forecast 
difficulty managers face (Ajinkya et al. 2005).  Surprise captures the difference between the 
management forecast and the consensus analyst forecast, and recent literature finds this to be 
associated with forecast quality (Ajinkya et al. 2005).  As discussed thoroughly in prior literature 
18 
it is more difficult to forecast earnings further from the fiscal period-end date (Baginski and 
Hassell 1997; Ajinkya et al. 2005), therefore I include a control for the forecast Horizon.  Firms 
that operate in industries that are more subject to shareholder litigation face different disclosure 
incentives, and therefore I include Litigation (Francis et al. 1994).   I am interested in the IT 
expertise of the CEO, and therefore I include a control for High Tech firms, because these types 
of firms may be more likely to employ a CEO with IT expertise.  Finally, recent literature shows 
that material weaknesses in internal controls detrimentally affect the accuracy of management 
forecasts (Feng et al. 2009; Li et al. 2013).  I therefore control for the presence of material 
weaknesses by including Weak. 
4.  RESULTS 
4.1 Univariate Results 
 Table 4 presents univariate results of comparisons between firms that employ CEOs with 
IT expertise and control firms.  Based on these results it appears that firms that employ CEOs 
with IT expertise tend to be smaller, less leveraged, report more volatile earnings and cash flows, 
experience greater sales growth, operate in less concentrated industries, operate in highly 
litigious industries, operate in high tech industries, and report fewer material weaknesses in 
internal controls.  However, most of these differences are relatively small and are included as 
control variables in my models because they may be associated with forecast quality.   
 Table 4 also presents the results for my main dependent variable (Abs_Error).  These 
results show that firms that employ a CEO with IT expertise tend to make forecasts with smaller 
errors.  This suggests that CEOs with IT expertise have access to superior internal information 
that allows them to make earnings forecasts that are more accurate.   
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
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4.2 Multivariate Results 
 Table 5 presents the accuracy of management forecasts regression results (when 
necessary additional control variables are presented in separate tables).  The results in Table 5 
utilize ordinary least squared regressions where the dependent variable is management forecast 
error measured as the absolute value of realized earnings less the management forecast scaled by 
lagged stock price.  The sample for Columns 1 through 3 consists of all forecasts with the 
necessary data.  I find that the coefficient on my variable of interest is negative and significant 
(IT Expert coefficient = -0.005, p-value = 0.005) in Column 1.  In other words, CEOs with IT 
expertise make earnings forecasts that are more accurate, which I argue is due to a high quality 
internal information environment.  In Column 2, I additionally include the Financial Exp 
variable to control for the financial expertise of the CEO.  I include this variable to determine if 
the incremental benefits of IT expertise outweigh the opportunity costs of giving up financial 
expertise as it applies to management forecasts.  I find that the coefficient for my variable of 
interest remains negative and significant (IT Expert coefficient = -0.005, p-value = 0.005), and 
that the coefficient on Financial Exp is not significant (p-value = 0.195).  This result confirms 
my prediction that for purposes of the internal information environment IT expertise is more 
beneficial than financial expertise.  However, as seen in Column 3, there are incremental benefits 
for CEOs with IT expertise to also have financial expertise (IT Expert coefficient = -0.004, p-
value = 0.029; coefficient on the interaction of IT Expert and Financial Exp = -0.006, p-value = 
0.100).  Therefore, while CEOs with IT expertise do improve the quality of the information 
environment yielding more accurate earnings forecasts, the optimal CEO may be one with both 
IT and financial expertise.   Finally, Column 4 uses a matched sample approach.13  I again find 
                                                 
13 See the research design section for a more thorough discussion of this approach. 
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that CEO IT expertise is associated with lower forecast error (IT Expert coefficient = -0.002, p-
value = 0.004).  Therefore, my results hold when comparing to a control group of firms of 
similar size and forecasting difficulty.   
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
 Complementing the results in Table 5, Table 6 examines forecast error for forecasts made 
at varying horizons.  Column 1 presents results using only the first management forecast made 
for each firm-year.  Column 2 presents results using only the most recent management forecast 
made before the firm formally announces earnings.  Finally, the dependent variable for Column 3 
is the average management forecast error for the given firm-year.  In all three models, I find that 
CEOs with IT expertise make earnings forecasts that are more accurate, as the coefficient on IT 
Expert is negative and significant in all three columns (p<0.05).  This suggests that regardless of 
the forecast horizon, CEOs with IT expertise are consistently more accurate than other CEOs.   
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
5. ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS 
5.1 Other Forecasting Attributes 
   Prior literature examines other forecasting attributes and finds that they are often 
associated with forecast accuracy (Ajinkya et al. 2005; Dorantes et al. 2013).  These attributes 
include the number of forecasts issued in a given year (Frequency), the precision of the forecast 
(Precision and PointF), and the bias of the forecast (Bias).  Given that I find that CEOs with IT 
expertise make forecasts that are more accurate, I examine whether there are any other 
significant differences in the forecasting behavior of CEOs with IT expertise.  To test this I run 
variations of the following model, which is a slight modification of Model (1) (see Table 2 for 
variable definitions): 
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Attributej,i,t = α0 + α1IT Expertj,i,t + α2Financial Expj,i,t + α3LnATi,t + α4Lossi,t + 
α5Leveragei,t + α6EarnVoli,t + α7CFOVoli,t + α8Growthi,t + α9IndConi,t + α10Big4i,t + 
α11LnAnalystsi,t + α12Std_AFj,i,t + α13High Techi,t + α14Surprisej,i,t + α15Horizonj,i,t + зj,i,t. 
(2). 
I run the model four separate times using the four different Attributes (Frequency, Precision, 
PointF, and Bias) as the dependent variables.  The model that uses Frequency as the dependent 
variable uses a firm-year sample and therefore any variables measured at the forecast level are 
the average for that firm-year.  I run the remaining models at the individual forecast level, and I 
therefore measure all of the variables at the forecast level.  Frequency is a count variable and 
therefore I run its model as an OLS regression.  PointF is an indicator variable and therefore I 
run its associated model as a logistic regression.  Precision is an ordinal variable that ranges 
from zero to three and therefore I run its associated model as an ordered logistic regression 
model.14  Finally, Bias is a continuous variable, and therefore I run its model as an OLS 
regression.  I include year fixed effects in all of the models and estimate robust standard errors 
clustered by firm.  As before, my variable of interest is IT Expert; if it is significant in any of the 
models then this would signify that CEOs with IT expertise display forecasting behavior that is 
different from other CEOs. 
 Table 7 presents the regression results for the other forecasting attributes tests.  As the 
table shows, IT Expert is not significant (p>0.10) in any of the columns.  This suggests that on 
average, other than forecast accuracy, CEOs with IT expertise do not differ in their forecasting 
behavior from other CEOs.  Therefore, CEOs with IT expertise make forecasts as frequently and 
                                                 
14 Following Choi et al. (2010), I alternatively measure Precision using a sample limited to point 
and range forecasts.  For this measure I set precision equal to 0 for point forecasts and for range 
forecasts I use the range of the forecast scaled by the lagged stock price multiplied by negative 
one.  I still find that IT Expert is not significant using this measure as the dependent variable. 
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as precise as other CEOs, but the forecasts made by the CEOs with IT expertise are more 
accurate.   
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
5.2 Alternative Earnings Management Explanation 
 For my hypothesis, I assume that CEOs with IT expertise make earnings forecasts that 
are more accurate because these CEOs foster a high quality internal information environment.  
However, another possible explanation for the improved accuracy of their earnings forecasts is 
that CEOs with IT expertise may be more willing or able to manage earnings to meet their 
forecasts.  Lynch and Gomaa (2003) suggest that newly implemented IT may allow management 
to commit fraud.  Additionally, Brazel and Dang (2008) find that firms report higher levels of 
abnormal discretionary accruals after implementing new IT, specifically enterprise resource 
planning systems.  I therefore provide additional tests to determine that the results that I find are 
truly due to improvements in the internal information environment and are not related to earnings 
management.   
 I specifically test the association between CEOs with IT expertise and common earnings 
management proxies identified in prior research.  The specific proxies that I use are the 
likelihood of reported earnings meeting or just beating the amount forecasted by management15 
(Just Beat), the likelihood of just beating using discretionary accruals (Just Beat with DAs), and 
the likelihood of earnings misstatements (Misstate).  See the Appendix for a detailed description 
of the calculation of these variables.  I use the following regression model adapted from prior 
                                                 
15 In untabulated results, I alternatively use the likelihood of meeting or just beating the most 
recent analyst forecast and arrive at similar results. 
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research (Frankel et al. 2002; Ashbaugh et al. 2003) to test the association between CEO IT 
expertise and earnings management (see Table 2 for variable definitions): 
[Earnings Management]i,t = ψ0 + ψ1IT Experti,t + ψ2Financial Expj,i,t +  ψ3LnATi,t + 
ψ4ROAi,t + ψ5Leveragei,t + ψ6Lossi,t + ψ7Returni,t + ψ8CFOi,t + ψ9Mergeri,t + ψ10CFOVoli,t 
+ ψ11EarnVoli,t + ψ12Big4i,t + ψ13Horizoni,t + ψ14 HighTechi,t + ψ15Financial Expj,i,t +  
зj,i,t.                       (3). 
I run the model three separate times, using my three different proxies for earnings management 
as the dependent variables.  All three variables are indicator variables, so each time I run the 
model as a logistic regression, and I include year indicators and estimate robust standard errors 
clustered by firm.  The sample for the model that uses Just Beat as the dependent variable only 
includes the last forecast before the earnings announcement for each firm.  The sample for the 
model that uses Just Beat with DAs limits the previous sample further by only including 
observations with reported earnings before discretionary accruals that are at or below the 
forecasted amount.  I measure the independent variables for the model that uses Misstate as the 
dependent variable at the firm-year level.16  If the alternate explanation that CEOs with IT 
expertise make earnings forecast that are more accurate because they manage earnings, then I 
expect the coefficient on IT Expert to be positive and significant in all of the models.  However, 
if my hypothesis is correct that CEOs wit IT expertise improve the internal information 
environment, then I do not expect the coefficient on IT Expert to be significant. 
 Table 8 presents the regression results for the earnings management tests.  The coefficient 
on IT Expert is not positive and significant in any of the columns, suggesting that CEOs with IT 
expertise are not more likely to engage in earnings management activities.  This supports my 
                                                 
16 This model does not include Horizon as a control variable because I do not estimate the model 
at the forecast level.  However, in untabulated results I include the average forecast Horizon as a 
control variable and the results remain essentially the same.   
24 
hypothesis that CEOs with IT expertise make earnings forecasts that are more accurate because 
they improve the internal information environment, and not because they manage earnings.  In 
fact, in Column 3 IT Expert is negative and significant (p=0.061), which suggests that firms that 
employ a CEO with IT expertise are less likely to misstate their financial statements.  This could 
be due to improvements in the internal information environment positively affecting financial 
reporting quality.  Overall, these results fail to support the alternative explanation that CEOs with 
IT expertise achieve forecast accuracy through earnings management.   
[Insert Table 8 Here] 
5.3 Analyst Earnings Forecast Revisions 
 Analysts have an incentive to issue accurate earnings forecasts, because their careers are 
dependent on the quality of their forecasts (Hong and Kubik 2003).  Therefore, analysts should 
desire to utilize high quality information when making their earnings forecasts.  One source of 
information that analysts use to make their forecasts is management forecasts (Baginski and 
Hassell 1990; Williams 1996; Cotter et al. 2006).  However, recent studies find that when 
analysts rely too strongly on the information in management forecasts, it can negatively affect 
their accuracy (Cotter et al. 2006; Feng and McVay 2010).  This suggests that the information 
provided by management is not always of the highest quality.   
 My initial results suggest that CEOs with IT expertise make forecasts that are more 
accurate.  However, if these CEOs with IT expertise improve the quality of the internal 
information environments, then their forecasts should also be more informative.  Essentially, I 
predict that in addition to improvements to the internal information environment, CEOs with IT 
expertise improve the quality of all information provided to parties external to the firm.  I 
therefore provide additional tests to determine if CEOs with IT expertise improve the quality of 
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the overall information environment surrounding the firm, as evidenced through analyst forecast 
revisions. 
 I specifically examine analyst forecast revisions made within 15 days following the 
issuance of a management forecast.  I first examine whether forecasts made by CEOs with IT 
expertise affect the analysts’ revision decisions.  Specifically, I test the likelihood that the 
analysts revise their forecasts following a management forecast (Revise).  I additionally test the 
extent to which analysts rely on the management forecast by examining the amount of the 
revision (RevisionAmount).  Finally, because prior literature finds that relying on management 
forecasts can negatively affect the accuracy of analyst forecasts, I examine the accuracy of the 
analyst forecast revisions (AFE_Post).  I use the following regression models adapted from prior 
research (Feng and McVay 2010) to test the association between CEO IT expertise and analyst 
forecast revisions (see Table 2 for variable definitions): 
Revisej,i,t = λ0 + λ1IT Expertj,i,t + λ2Surprisej,i,t + λ3Down j,i,t + λ4Horizon j,i,t + λ5LnAnalysts 
j,i,t + λ6Range j,i,t + λ7Lossi,t + λ8LnATi,t +  зj,i,t.           (4) 
 
RevisionAmountj,i,t = φ 0 + φ 1IT Expertj,i,t + φ 2Surprisej,i,t + φ 3Down j,i,t + φ 4Horizon j,i,t 
+ φ5LnAnalysts j,i,t + φ 6Range j,i,t + φ 7Lossi,t + φ 8LnATi,t +  φ 9Surprise*IT Expertj,i,t + 
φ10Surprise*Down j,i,t + φ 11Surprise*Horizon j,i,t + φ 12Surprise*LnAnalysts j,i,t + 
φ13Surprise*Rangej,i,t + φ 14Surprise*Lossj,i,t + φ 15Surprise*LnATj,i,t +  зj,i,t.       (5) 
 
AFE_Postj,i,t = π0 + π1IT Expertj,i,t + π2Down j,i,t + π3Horizon j,i,t + π4LnAnalysts j,i,t + 
π5Range j,i,t + π6Lossi,t + π7LnATi,t +  π8RevisionAmountj,i,t + π9ROA,i,t + π10Mergeri,t + 
π11Foreigni,t + π12Std_AF_Postj,i,t  +  зj,i,t.            (6). 
Revise is an indicator variable and therefore model (4) is run as a logistic regression.  
RevisionAmount and AFE_Post are both continuous variables and therefor I estimate models (5) 
and (6) using OLS regressions.  In all of the models, I include year indicator variables and 
estimate robust standard errors clustered by firm.  My variable of interest is IT Expert.  In model 
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(4) I expect the coefficient on IT Expert to be positive and significant, indicating that analysts are 
more likely to revise their earnings forecasts following a management forecast if a CEO with IT 
expertise issues the forecast.  I also expect a positive and significant coefficient on the interaction 
of IT Expert and Surprise in model (5).  A positive coefficient in model (5) would indicate that 
the analysts are more strongly relying on the information provided by forecasts made by CEOs 
with IT expertise.  Finally, I expect a negative and significant coefficient on IT Expert in model 
(6).  In line with my hypothesis, I expect the overall quality of the information environment for 
firms that employ CEOs with IT expertise to be better.  This in turn should improve the quality 
of analyst forecasts, and therefore I predict that analyst revisions are more accurate if they follow 
a management forecast issued by a CEO with IT expertise.   
 Panels A, B, and C of Table 9 present the regression results for the analyst forecast 
revision tests.  As expected, the coefficient on IT Expertise is significant (p<0.10) and in the 
predicted direction in all three columns.  In Column 1, the positive coefficient signifies that 
analysts are more likely to revise their forecasts immediately following a management forecast if 
a CEO with IT expertise issues that forecast.  In Column 2, the positive coefficient on the 
interaction of IT Expert and Surprise suggests that analysts will revise their forecasts to a greater 
degree if they are doing so in response to a forecast issued by a CEO with IT expertise.  Overall, 
these results support my hypothesis that analysts are more likely to rely on the information 
provided by CEOs with IT expertise.  Finally, the negative coefficient on IT Expertise in Column 
3 (in Panel C) means that analyst forecast revisions are more accurate if they are made using 
information from management forecasts issued by CEOs with IT expertise.  This result 
somewhat contradicts prior research that finds that analysts that follow management forecasts too 
closely suffer from decreased accuracy (Feng and McVay 2010).  Overall, these results suggest 
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that CEOs with IT expertise foster a quality information environment that improves the quality 
of information flows both internally and externally.   
[Insert Table 9 Here] 
5.4 Self-Selection Bias 
 In previous tests, I use a matched sample of firms to identify a control group that is most 
similar to my treatment group across multiple characteristics.  However, that sample fails to 
alleviate all of the concerns regarding self-selection bias.  It is possible that firms with superior 
IT capabilities will choose to employ CEOs with IT expertise and therefore it is not necessarily 
the expertise of the CEO that leads to accurate earnings forecasts.  In this section, I examine this 
potential self-selection bias by using the Heckman two-stage model (Heckman 1979).  To use 
this model I regress the choice of employing a CEO with IT expertise on a set of variables shown 
to be associated with firms making IT governance changes (Haislip et al. 2013).  I use this first 
stage to calculate the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR).  The first stage probit models is as follows: 
IT Experti,t = Ω0 + Ω1LnATi,t + Ω2ROAi,t + Ω3Leveragei,t + Ω4High Techi,t + Ω5CIOi,t + 
Ω6ITWeaki,t + Ω7SalesVoli,t + Ω8Std_Returni,t + Ω9Foreigni,t + Ω10Mergeri,t + 
Ω11Restructi,t + Ω12Prodcut_Diffi,t + Ω13Cost_Leaderi,t + Ω14Transformi,t                     (7) 
where: 
 
CIO  = 1 if the firm employs a chief information officer or chief technology officer 
that is among the top five compensated employees, and 0 otherwise;  
 
ITWeak  = 1 if the firm reports an IT material weakness in internal controls, and 0 
otherwise;  
SalesVol  = the standard deviation of sales growth for the previous five years;  
 
Std_Return  = the standard deviation of returns for the previous five years;  
 
Restruct  = 1 if the firm engages in restructuring activity, and 0 otherwise;  
 
Product_Diff  = operating income divided by sales;  
 
Cost_Leader  = sales divided by total assets;  
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Transform  = 1 if the firm is in a transform industry IT role, and 0 otherwise;  
 
and all other variables are as previously defined.   
 Panels A and B of Table 10 present the results of this first stage model.  The sample for 
Column 1 includes all available forecasts.  All of the variables for Column 2, including the 
dependent variable, are the averages for each company year. The sample for Column 3 utilizes a 
matched sample as discussed in the research design section.  There is some indication in the 
results that firms that employ CEOs with IT expertise are smaller, more profitable, and less 
leveraged firms.  In addition, it appears that these firms tend to operate in high tech industries 
and employ a CIO.  These firms also have highly volatile sales.  They are more likely to have 
foreign operations, but are less likely to be involved in a merger or restructuring.  It also appears 
that these firms choose are apt to choose a product differentiation strategy over a cost leadership 
strategy.  Finally, these firms are likely to operate in a Transform industry.  These results are in 
line with the expectations developed in Haislip et al. (2013). 
 I next include the IMR calculated from the first stage in my main model of forecast error 
which again includes year indicator variables and robust standard errors clustered by firm (model 
1).  Panels C and D of Table 10 present the regression results from the second stage model of the 
self-selection bias tests.  The sample for Column 1 includes all available forecast observations.  
All of the variables in Column 2, including the dependent variable, are the averages for each 
firm-year.  The sample for Column 3 utilizes the matched sample design discussed in the 
research design section.  My variable of interest is again IT Expert which I expect to be negative 
and significant.  As can be seen in Table 10, the coefficient on IT Expert is negative and 
significant (p<0.05) in all three columns.  This suggests that even after controlling for self-
selection bias, I still find that firms with CEOs with IT expertise issue more accurate earnings 
29 
forecasts.  Interestingly, in Column 1 the coefficient on IMR is statistically significant (p=0.012).  
This suggests that self-selection bias may be a legitimate concern in this research design, and 
therefore controlling for the inverse mills ratio is appropriate.   
[Insert Table 10 Here] 
5.5 Quarterly Forecasts 
 In my primary tests I only examine forecasts of annual earnings.  Forecasts of quarterly 
earnings are made less frequently and often with shorter horizons, and therefore they may be 
affected differently by the expertise of the CEO.  In this section I examine the effect of CEO IT 
expertise on quarterly earnings forecasts.   
 Not all firms choose to issue quarterly earnings forecasts.  Prior research suggests that 
managers with superior information may be inclined to issue more voluntary disclosures to 
signal their superior ability or to reduce information asymmetry (Trueman 1986; Verrechia 
1990).  Therefore because a CEO with IT expertise improves the internal information 
environment of their firm, firms that employ these CEOs may be more likely to issue quarterly 
earnings forecasts.   
 In my first test of quarterly earnings forecasts, I examine the likelihood of a firm issuing 
any quarterly forecasts during the year.  To test this I use model 2, but replace the dependent 
variable with Issued_Quarterly.  Issued_Quarterly is an indicator variable coded one if the firm 
issues any quarterly earnings forecasts in year t and zero otherwise.  I use model 2 because the 
decision to issue a quarterly earnings forecast is similar to the decision to issue a greater number 
of annual forecasts (Frequency).  I estimate the model using a logistic regression with robust 
standard errors clustered by firm.  As before, my variable of interest is IT Expert.  I expect this 
variable to be positive and significant, signifying that firms that employ CEOs with IT expertise 
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are more likely to issue quarterly forecasts.  In my second test of quarterly earnings forecasts I 
run a modified version of model 1.  In this test I am examining if CEOs with IT expertise are 
able to maintain their accuracy advantage in the quarterly forecast setting.  Therefore, I run 
model 1 the same as in the initial tests, but the sample consists of all available quarterly earnings 
forecasts.  This model is estimated using an OLS regression with robust standard errors clustered 
by firm.  Finally, my variable of interest is again IT Expert.  I expect this variable to be negative 
and significant, indicating that CEOs with IT expertise issue quarterly earnings forecasts that are 
more accurate than those issued by other CEOs.   
 Table 11 presents the results from the quarterly forecast tests.  Column 1 presents the 
results of the model testing the likelihood of issuing a quarterly forecasts.  The coefficient on IT 
Expert is positive, but not significant (p=0.170).  This suggests that CEOs with IT expertise are 
not any more likely than other CEOs to issue a quarterly earnings forecasts.  However, the 
coefficient on IT Expert is negative and significant (p=0.027) in Column 2.  This column 
presents the results from the model testing the accuracy of quarterly forecasts.  The negative 
coefficient indicates that CEOs with IT expertise do issue quarterly forecasts that are more 
accurate than other CEOs.  This provides further evidence that CEOs with IT expertise help 
create an improved internal information environment in their firms, which leads to more accurate 
earnings forecasts. 
 In further testing, I run the analysis separately by each fiscal quarter.  The results for this 
analysis are presented in panels C-F of Table 11.  Column 1 presents the results for Q1, Column 
2 presents the results for Q2, Column 3 presents the results for Q3, and Column 4 presents the 
results for Q4.  The coefficient on IT Expert is negative and significant in columns 2, 3, and 4.  
This suggests that CEOs with IT expertise are more accurate at forecasts earnings for every fiscal 
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quarter except for the first quarter of the year.  This suggests that the improvements that CEOs 
with IT expertise make to the information environment show benefits throughout the majority of 
the year.   
[Insert Table 11 Here] 
5.6 Presence of CIO 
 Given that prior research finds that when a firm’s IT is working effectively they have a 
high quality internal information environment (Li et al. 2012; Dorantes et al. 2013), it may be 
important to consider the presence and role of a CIO.  A CIO or Chief Technology Officer 
(CTO) should have ultimate responsibility regarding IT.  If a CIO is given sufficient power and 
responsibility they should be able to positively influence the information environment by 
ensuring that the firm’s IT is working effectively.  Therefore, it may be possible that CEOs with 
IT expertise may be more likely to employ and rely on a CIO, and thus not directly affect the 
utilization of IT.   
 To test this alternative explanation I first use Execucomp to identify firms with a CIO or 
CTO among their top five paid employees.  This should identify those firms that feature a CIO in 
a prominent enough role to effectively influence the usage of IT in the firm.  I then run model 1 
as before, but I include CIO, which is an indicator variable coded one if the firm has a CIO or 
CTO in their top five paid employees in year t and zero otherwise.  I again run the model as an 
OLS regression using robust standard errors clustered by firm.  If the CIO significantly affects 
the information environment as suggested above, then I expect the coefficient on CIO to be 
negative and significant.  I also expect the coefficient on IT Expert to be negative and significant, 
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because I still predict that CEOs with IT expertise are able to improve the information 
environment above whatever benefits a CIO provides.17   
 Table 12 presents the results from the CIO alternative explanation tests.   The sample for 
Column 1 includes all available forecast observations.  All of the variables in Column 2, 
including the dependent variable, are the averages for each firm-year.  The sample for Column 3 
utilizes the matched sample design discussed in the research design section.  In all three 
columns, the coefficient on IT Expert is negative and significant (p<0.01), suggesting that even 
in the presence of a CIO a CEO with IT expertise is found to positively influence the information 
environment.  In addition, the coefficient on CIO is not significant (p>0.10) in any of the 
columns suggesting that the tone set by the CEO is truly what determines the degree to which IT 
is utilized to improve the information environment.   
[Insert Table 12 Here] 
5.7 IT Expertise, Management Forecast Accuracy, and Internal Controls 
 Prior literature finds that material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting 
detrimentally affect management forecast accuracy (Feng et al. 2009; Li et al. 2012).  These 
authors argue that CEOs at firms with material weaknesses in internal controls must rely on 
information that is of low quality.  Ineffective controls create an internal information 
environment that produces low quality information.  Prior literature also examines the 
association between executive IT expertise and material weaknesses in internal controls, and 
documents mixed results.  Li et al. (2007) do not find any association between executive IT 
                                                 
17 In untabulated analysis I also run the model including an interaction of IT Expert and CIO to 
identify the marginal benefits of employing both a CEO with IT expertise and a CIO.  However, 
neither the interaction term nor the main effect of CIO are statistically significant (p>0.10) in this 
analysis.   
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expertise and IT material weaknesses.  However, Haislip et al. (2013) find that firms that report 
an IT material weakness report fewer weaknesses in the future if they replace their Chief 
Financial Officer with one that has IT expertise.  Therefore, another possible explanation for my 
documented improvements in management forecast accuracy could be that CEOs with IT 
expertise create a better internal control environment.  While this should also create a better 
internal information environment, it is a second-order effect as opposed to my predicted first-
order effect.  I therefore provide additional tests to examine this possibility. 
 I first test the association between CEOs with IT expertise and material weaknesses in 
internal controls.  I use the following logistic regression, adapted from prior research (Ge and 
McVay 2005; Doyle et al. 2007; Li et al. 2007; Haislip et al. 2013), to test this association (see 
Table 2 for variable definitions): 
Weak,i,t = γ0 + γ1IT Experti,t +γ2Financial Expi,t +  γ3LnATi,t + γ4ROAi,t + γ5Big4i,t + 
γ6Leveragei,t + γ7Lossi,t + γ8Growthi,t + γ9Segmenti,t + γ10Foreigni,t + γ11Mergeri,t + 
γ12Hightechi,t + εi,t         (3). 
The dependent variable, Weak¸ is an indicator variable coded as one if the firm reports any 
material weaknesses in internal controls in the current year, and zero otherwise.  I additionally 
run the model limiting the dependent variable to IT related material weakness, because CEOs 
with IT expertise may be especially adept at preventing these types of weaknesses.  I then run the 
model a third time using only non-IT related material weaknesses.  I include year fixed effects in 
all of the models and estimate robust standard errors clustered by firm.  My variable of interest is 
IT Expert.  If the coefficient on this variable is significant in any of the models than this would 
suggest a relationship exists between CEO IT expertise and the likelihood of a firm reporting a 
material weakness in internal controls.   
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 Table 13 presents the regression results for the likelihood of material weakness tests.  IT 
Expert is not significant (p>0.10) in any of the columns.  This suggests that CEOs with IT 
expertise are not any better or worse than other CEOs at preventing material weaknesses in 
internal controls of any kind.  This supports my prediction that CEOs with IT expertise directly 
improve the quality of the internal information environment.   
[Insert Table 13 Here] 
 To test this alternative explanation further, I run the following modification to model (1) 
(see Table 2 for variable definitions): 
Abs_Errorj,i,t = δ0 + δ1IT Expertj,i,t + δ2Weaki,t  + δ3Weak*IT Expertj,i,t + δ4Financial 
Expj,i,t + δ5LnATi,t + δ6ROAi,+ δ7Lossi,t + δ8Leveragei,t + δ9EarnVoli,t + δ10CFOVoli,t + 
δ11Growthi,t + δ12IndConi,t + δ13Big4i,t + δ14LnAnalystsi,t + δ15Std_AFj,i,t + δ16High Techi,t 
+ δ17Surprisej,i,t + δ18Horizonj,i,t  +  зj,i,t.      (4). 
This model is my primary model with the addition of the Weak variable as well as the interaction 
of IT Expert and Weak.  As in the previous model, I run this model three separate times using the 
different material weakness categories (any material weaknesses, only IT weaknesses, and only 
non-IT weaknesses).  I estimate this model using an OLS regression, and I include year fixed 
effects and estimate robust standard errors clustered by firm.  I expect the coefficient on IT 
Expert to be negative, suggesting that CEOs with IT expertise make earnings forecasts that are 
more accurate after controlling for the presence of material weaknesses.  I expect the coefficient 
on Weak to be positive because prior literature suggests that firms with material weaknesses in 
internal controls issue earnings forecasts that are less accurate (Feng at al. 2009; Li et al. 2012).  
Finally, I am also interested in the interaction of these two variables (IT Expert and Weak).  I 
expect this variable to be negative and significant.  I predict that CEOs with IT expertise are able 
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to reduce the negative effects to the information environment created by the material weaknesses 
in internal controls.   
 Table 14 (Panel A) presents the regression results for the management forecast error and 
material weakness tests.  IT Expert is negative and significant (p<0.01) in all four columns, 
suggesting that even when controlling for the presence of material weaknesses, CEOs with IT 
expertise still make earnings forecasts that are more accurate.  As expected, in the majority of the 
columns material weaknesses are associated with management forecasts that are less accurate (In 
Column 1 Weak is positive and significant p=0.037; in Columns 3 and 4 NonITWeak is positive 
and significant p<0.10).   This agrees with prior literature that finds that firms with material 
weaknesses issue less accurate earnings forecasts (Feng et al. 2009).  Finally, in every column 
the coefficient on the interaction terms are negative and significant (p<0.05).  This suggests that 
CEOs with IT expertise are able to mitigate the negative effects created by material weaknesses 
in internal controls.  In fact, F-tests show that in Columns 2 and 4 CEOs with IT expertise are 
able to completely overcome and eliminate the negative effects created by IT material 
weaknesses.  Overall, the evidence suggests that CEOs with IT expertise are not more accurate 
because of improvements to internal control, but instead are accurate in spite of poor internal 
controls. 
[Insert Table 14 Here] 
6. CONCLUSION 
 The extant literature documents that benefits firms receive from implementing IT, 
specifically improvements to the internal information environment.  However, prior literature 
also documents that firms often do not utilize IT fully.  Researchers also suggest that people with 
experience working with IT are more likely to utilize IT in the future.  Using a sample of firms 
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that all utilize IT for their internal information system, I provide evidence of the further benefits 
firms can extract from IT if they employ a CEO with IT expertise.  Specifically, I examine 
whether CEOs with IT expertise issue earnings forecasts that are more accurate.  My study 
extends the literature by documenting how CEOs with IT expertise can improve the internal 
information environment, as evidenced by management forecasts. 
 I find that IT expertise allows CEOs to improve the quality of internal information 
environment.  Specifically CEOs with IT expertise issue earnings forecasts that are more 
accurate (an external signal of the quality of internal information).  This evidence suggests that 
IT expertise can be a vital attribute for firms to consider when making employment decisions.  I 
additionally document that these CEOs do not achieve this improved accuracy through earnings 
management mechanisms.  Finally, I find that immediately following an earnings forecast issued 
by a CEO with IT expertise, analysts are more likely to revise their forecasts.  Additionally, I 
find that these same analyst revisions are of a greater amount, and that they are more accurate.  
Overall, the evidence suggests that CEOs with IT expertise foster a high quality information 
environment. 
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Table 1 
Sample Selection Process 
Panel A:  Sample selection 
and data sources                   Number of 
Firm-Years 
  Number of 
Forecasts                       
Sample of S&P 1500 firms 2004-2010      10,500   
Less:  firms in Financial Services or Utilities industries (SIC codes 4900-4999 and 6000-6999)   2,376     
Sample of S&P 1500 firms from 2004 to 2010 within desired industries    8,124   
Less:  firms without necessary data from Compustat or Audit Analytics       490     
Sample of S&P 1500 firms from 2004 to 2010 with necessary data from Compustat and Audit 
Analytics 7,634   
Less:  firms with missing First Call data or without multiple analysts following       3,752     
Sample of S&P 1500 firms from 2004 to 2010 with all necessary data    3,882  18,151 
Less:  firms with no annual point or range forecasts           353   1,252 
Final Sample of usable observations             3,529   16,899 
             
Panel B:  Year Distributions                     
Year 
 IT 
Expertise 
Forecasts 
 IT 
Expertise 
Firms 
 
All Other 
Forecasts 
 All 
Other 
Firms 
 
All 
Forecasts 
 
All Firms             
2004  20  7  1,653  383  1,673  390 
2005  59  13  2,430  509  2,489  522 
2006  61  16  2,581  538  2,642  554 
2007  69  18  2,491  535  2,560  553 
2008  78  22  2,664  524  2,742  546 
2009  83  20  2,217  450  2,300  470 
2010   91   22   2,402   472   2,493   494 
Total   461   118   16,438   3,411   16,899   3,529 
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Panel C:  Industry Distributions 
Industry 
2-Digit 
SIC Code 
 IT Expertise 
Forecasts 
 IT Expertise 
Firms 
 All Other 
Forecasts 
 All Other 
Firms 
 All 
Forecasts 
 
All Firms             
Chemicals 28-29  45  9  1,902  350  1,947  359 
Electrical 36, 38  97  26  2,420  510  2,517  536 
Equipment 35  12  2  1,109  225  1,121  227 
Retail 
Sales 50-59  58  15  3,157  655  3,215  670 
Services 70-79  214  57  1,964  467  2,178  524 
All Others All Others   35   9   5,886   1204   5,921   1,213 
Total     461   118   16,438   3,411   16,899   3,529 
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Table 2 Variable Definitions 
          
Panel A: Dependent Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition                   
Abs_Error 
the absolute value of the management forecast error (realized earnings 
less the management forecast) / lagged stock price. 
Bias 
the signed value of the management forecast error (realized earnings less 
the management forecast)/ lagged stock price 
Precision 
an ordinal variable coded 3 for point forecasts, 2 for range forecasts, 1 for 
open ended forecasts, and 0 for all other forecasts. 
PointF 
an indicator variable coded one if the forecast is a point forecast and zero 
otherwise. 
Frequency the number of management forecasts issued for fiscal year t. 
Just Beat 
an indicator variable coded one if earnings are equal to or within two 
cents greater than the management forecast, and zero otherwise. 
Just Beat with 
DAs 
an indicator variable coded one if the earnings are equal to or within two 
cents greater than the management forecast, but earnings before 
discretionary accruals are less than the management forecast, and zero 
otherwise. 
Misstatement 
an indicator variable coded one if the firm has a material misstatement in 
year t, and zero otherwise. 
Revise 
an indicator variable coded one if there is a revision to the consensus 
analyst forecast made within 15 days following the management forecast, 
and zero otherwise. 
RevisionAmount 
the difference between the revised consensus analyst forecast (made 
within 15 days after the management forecast) and the preexisting 
consensus analyst forecast, scaled by lagged stock price. 
AFE_Post 
the absolute value of the median consensus analyst forecast error 15 days 
following a management forecast, scaled by lagged stock price. 
Issued_Quarterly 
an indicator variable coded one if the firm issues any quarterly forecasts 
in year t and zero otherwise.   
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Table 2 Variable Definitions 
 
Panel B: Independent Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition                   
IT Expert 
an indicator variable coded one if the CEO is considered to have IT expertise 
based on work experience or education background as described in the 
research design section, and zero otherwise. 
LnAT the natural log of total assets in year t. 
Loss 
an indicator variable coded one if the firm reports a net loss in year t, and zero 
otherwise. 
Leverage total liabilities divided by total assets in year t. 
EarnVol the standard deviation of ROA over the prior 10 years. 
CFOVol the standard deviation of operating cash flows over the prior 10 years. 
Growth percentage of sales growth from year t-1 to year t. 
IndCon 
the Herfindahl index in year t, measured as the sum of the squares of the 
market shares of all firms within the same three-digit SIC industry. 
Big4 
an indicator variable coded one if the firm engages a Big 4 auditor in year t, 
and zero otherwise. 
LnAnalysts 
the natural log of the number of analysts following the firm at the end of year 
t. 
Std_AF 
the standard deviation of the individual analyst forecasts for year t, 
immediately prior to the management forecast for year t. 
News 
the management forecast value less the pre-existing median analyst forecast 
scaled by lagged stock price. 
Horizon 
the number of days between the date of issuance for the management forecast 
and the fiscal year end date. 
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Table 2 Variable Definitions 
 
Panel B: Independent Variable Definitions continued 
Variable Definition                   
Litigation 
an indicator variable coded one if the firm operates in an industry that is 
associated with increased litigation (SIC codes 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 7370-
7374, and 3600-3674 following Francis et al. 1994) and zero otherwise. 
High Tech 
an indicator variable coded one if the firm operates in a high tech industry (as 
identified by Francis and Schipper 1999), and zero otherwise. 
Segment the total number of reportable segments in year t. 
Foreign 
an indicator variable coded one if the firm engaged in foreign transaction in 
year t, and zero otherwise. 
Merger 
an indicator variable coded one if the firm engaged in mergers and acquisitions 
in year t, and zero otherwise. 
ROA 
the return on assets calculated as net income before extraordinary items 
divided by total assets in year t. 
Return the 12-month buy and hold return before the date of the management forecast. 
CFO cash flows from operations divided by total assets. 
Weak 
an indicator variable coded one  if the firm reports any material weaknesses in 
internal controls in year t, and zero otherwise 
Financial 
Exp 
an indicator variable coded one if the CEO has financial expertise through 
possessing a CPA license, previously working in public accounting, or 
previously working in another financial related position such as chief financial 
officer, and zero otherwise.  
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics 
   Standard 
Deviation 
 25th 
Percentile 
 
Median 
 75th 
Percentile Variable Mean         
LnAT 7.767  1.455  6.696  7.620  8.635 
ROA 0.063  0.083  0.038  0.064  0.097 
Loss 0.081  0.273  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Leverage 0.510  0.187  0.391  0.510  0.621 
EarnVol 0.036  0.054  0.017  0.025  0.038 
CFOVol 0.415  0.032  0.025  0.035  0.050 
Growth 0.103  0.189  0.018  0.083  0.160 
IndCon 0.068  0.074  0.037  0.051  0.071 
Big4 0.951  0.215  1.000  1.000  1.000 
LnAnalysts 2.302  0.620  1.946  2.303  2.773 
Std_AF 0.105  0.914  0.033  0.055  0.098 
News -0.003  0.080  -0.002  0.000  0.001 
Horizon 204.970  69.419  180.000  202.000  233.000 
Litigation 0.194  0.396  0.000  0.000  0.000 
High Tech 0.241  0.428  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Weak 0.045  0.207  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Financial Exp 0.137  0.344  0.000  0.000  0.000 
IT Expert 0.034  0.179  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Abs_Error 0.014  0.043  0.002  0.005  0.014 
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Table 4 
Univariate Analysis 
 IT Expertise 
Observations 
 All Other 
Observations 
    
      
  N= 118   N = 3,411   Difference   P-Value 
Panel A:  Control Variables             
LnAT 7.413  7.779  -0.366  0.007*** 
Loss 0.068  0.082  -0.014  0.592 
Leverage 0.422  0.513  -0.091  <0.001*** 
EarnVol 0.084  0.034  0.050  <0.001*** 
CFOVol 0.072  0.040  0.032  <0.001*** 
Growth 0.134  0.101  0.033  0.064* 
IndCon 0.042  0.069  -0.027  <0.001*** 
Big4 0.958  0.951  0.007  0.744 
LnAnalysts 2.383  2.299  0.084  0.149 
Std_AF 0.066  0.106  -0.040  0.638 
News -0.001  -0.003  0.002  0.775 
Horizon 205.85  204.939  0.911  0.889 
Litigation 0.568  0.182  0.386  <0.001*** 
High Tech 0.568  0.230  0.338  <0.001*** 
ROA 0.074  0.062  0.011  0.148 
Weak 0.022  0.046  -0.024  0.015** 
Financial Exp 0.144   0.137   0.007   0.831 
Abs_Error 0.007  0.014  -0.007  0.062* 
All p-values are two-tailed. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 
0.01 respectively. 
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Table 5 
Management Earnings Forecast Error 
Panel A  Column 1  Column 2 
Variables Pred 
Absolute Forecast 
Error 
  
Absolute Forecast 
Error 
Intercept ? 0.018***  0.018*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
IT Expert - -0.005***  -0.005*** 
  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Financial Exp -   -0.001 
    (0.195) 
LnAT - -0.001*  -0.001* 
  (0.069)  (0.066) 
ROA - -0.077***  -0.077*** 
  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Loss + 0.008**  0.008** 
  (0.023)  (0.022) 
Leverage + 0.000  0.000 
  (0.475)  (0.447) 
EarnVol + -0.005  -0.004 
  (0.635)  (0.611) 
CFOVol + 0.046  0.045 
  (0.114)  (0.118) 
Year Indicators  Included  Included 
Number of observations  16,899  16,899 
Adjusted R2  0.330  0.330 
F-Statistic   7.680***   7.410*** 
The dependent variable is forecast error measured as the absolute value of management 
forecast error, (realized earnings less the management forecast amount)/lagged stock price.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The p-values are listed in parentheses under the coefficient.  
The sample for columns 1-3 includes all available forecasts.  The sample for column 4 utilizes 
a matched sample as discussed in the research design section.  The models are estimated using 
ordinary least squares regressions with robust standard errors clustered by company. 
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Table 5 
Management Earnings Forecast Error 
Panel B  Column 1  Column 2 
Variables Pred 
Absolute Forecast 
Error 
  
Absolute Forecast 
Error 
Growth + -0.005  -0.005 
  (0.979)  (0.979) 
IndCon - -0.003  -0.003 
  (0.311)  (0.319) 
Big4 ? 0.004***  0.004*** 
  (0.006)  (0.007) 
LnAnalysts - 0.000  0.000 
  (0.594)  (0.586) 
Std_AF + 0.001  0.001 
  (0.203)  (0.203) 
News - -0.279***  -0.279*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Horizon + 0.000***  0.000*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Litigation - -0.005**  -0.005** 
  (0.032)  (0.033) 
High Tech ? -0.002  -0.002 
  (0.508)  (0.485) 
Weak + 0.008**  0.008** 
  (0.042)  (0.042) 
Year Indicators  Included  Included 
Number of observations  16,899  16,899 
Adjusted R2  0.330  0.330 
F-Statistic   7.680***   7.410*** 
The dependent variable is forecast error measured as the absolute value of management 
forecast error, (realized earnings less the management forecast amount)/lagged stock price.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The p-values are listed in parentheses under the coefficient.  
The sample for columns 1-3 includes all available forecasts.  The sample for column 4 utilizes 
a matched sample as discussed in the research design section.  The models are estimated using 
ordinary least squares regressions with robust standard errors clustered by company. 
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Table 5 
Management Earnings Forecast Error 
Panel C  Column 3  Column 4 
Variables Pred 
Absolute Forecast 
Error 
 Absolute Forecast 
Error 
Intercept ? 0.018***  0.013*** 
  (0.000)  (0.001) 
IT Expert - -0.004**  -0.002*** 
  (0.029)  (0.004) 
Financial Exp - -0.001  -0.002** 
  (0.235)  (0.030) 
Financial Exp* IT Expert - -0.006*   
  (0.100)   
LnAT - -0.001*  -0.000 
  (0.068)  (0.166) 
ROA - -0.076***  -0.017* 
  (0.002)  (0.074) 
Loss + 0.008**  0.006 
  (0.023)  (0.112) 
Leverage + 0.001  -0.002 
  (0.415)  (0.623) 
EarnVol + -0.002  0.002 
  (0.559)  (0.418) 
CFOVol + 0.047  0.007 
  (0.113)  (0.332) 
Year Indicators  Included  Included 
Number of observations  16,899  900 
Adjusted R2  0.330  0.253 
F-Statistic   7.290***  8.270*** 
The dependent variable is forecast error measured as the absolute value of management 
forecast error, (realized earnings less the management forecast amount)/lagged stock price.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The p-values are listed in parentheses under the coefficient.  
The sample for columns 1-3 includes all available forecasts.  The sample for column 4 utilizes 
a matched sample as discussed in the research design section.  The models are estimated using 
ordinary least squares regressions with robust standard errors clustered by company. 
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Table 5 
Management Earnings Forecast Error 
Panel D  Column 3  Column 4 
Variables Pred 
Absolute Forecast 
Error 
 Absolute Forecast 
Error 
Growth + -0.005  -0.004 
  (0.979)  (0.801) 
IndCon - -0.003  0.040 
  (0.310)  (0.777) 
Big4 ? 0.004***  -0.001 
  (0.007)  (0.664) 
LnAnalysts - 0.000  -0.001** 
  (0.571)  (0.040) 
Std_AF + 0.001  0.019*** 
  (0.204)  (0.001) 
News - -0.279***  0.307*** 
  (0.000)  (0.002) 
Horizon + 0.000***  0.000*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Litigation - -0.005**  0.002 
  (0.031)  (0.817) 
High Tech ? -0.002  -0.002 
  (0.478)  (0.200) 
Weak + 0.008**  -0.000 
  (0.042)  (0.527) 
Year Indicators  Included  Included 
Number of observations  16,899  900 
Adjusted R2  0.330  0.253 
F-Statistic   7.290***  8.270*** 
The dependent variable is forecast error measured as the absolute value of management 
forecast error, (realized earnings less the management forecast amount)/lagged stock price.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The p-values are listed in parentheses under the coefficient.  
The sample for columns 1-3 includes all available forecasts.  The sample for column 4 utilizes 
a matched sample as discussed in the research design section.  The models are estimated using 
ordinary least squares regressions with robust standard errors clustered by company. 
 55 
Table 6 
Management Earnings Forecast Error Using Different Forecast Horizons 
Panel A  Column 1  Column 2  Column 3 
Variables Pred 
Absolute Error 
of Most Recent 
Forecast 
  
Absolute 
Error of First 
Forecast 
  
Average Absolute 
Forecast Error 
Intercept  0.014**  0.020***  0.014*** 
  (0.012)  (0.000)  (0.006) 
IT Expert - -0.003**  -0.005**  -0.004** 
  (0.040)  (0.024)  (0.024) 
Financial Exp - -0.001  -0.002  -0.001 
  (0.279)  (0.161)  (0.203) 
LnAT - -0.001**  -0.001*  -0.001 
  (0.045)  (0.076)  (0.133) 
ROA - (-0.090)  (-0.105)  (-0.098) 
  (0.007)  (0.003)  (0.005) 
Loss + 0.009*  0.017***  0.014*** 
  (0.054)  (0.001)  (0.005) 
Leverage + 0.001  0.001  -0.001 
  (0.377)  (0.435)  (0.630) 
EarnVol + -0.004  -0.016  -0.009 
  (0.610)  (0.861)  (0.714) 
CFOVol + 0.034  0.073**  0.055 
  (0.236)  (0.048)  (0.112) 
Year Indicators  Included  Included  Included 
Number of 
observations 
 3,529  3,529 
 
3,529 
Adjusted R2  0.311  0.323  0.342 
F-Statistic   8.780***   10.810***   11.020*** 
The dependent variable is forecast error measured as the absolute value of management 
forecast error, (realized earnings less the management forecast amount)/lagged stock price.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The p-values are listed in parentheses under the coefficient.  
The sample for column 1 only includes the first annual forecast for each company year.  The 
sample for column 2 only includes the most recent annual forecast made before earnings are 
announced.  All of the variables for column 3, including the dependent variable, are the 
averages for each company year.  The models are estimated using ordinary least squares 
regressions with robust standard errors clustered by company. 
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Table 6 
Management Earnings Forecast Error Using Different Forecast Horizons 
Panel B  Column 1  Column 2  Column 3 
Variables Pred 
Absolute Error 
of Most Recent 
Forecast 
  
Absolute 
Error of First 
Forecast 
  
Average Absolute 
Forecast Error 
Growth + -0.004  -0.008  -0.004 
  (0.872)  (0.973)  (0.838) 
IndCon - 0.002  0.002  -0.002 
  (0.608)  (0.601)  (0.416) 
Big4 ? 0.005**  0.004*  0.005** 
  (0.013)  (0.085)  (0.017) 
LnAnalysts - 0.001  -0.000  -0.001 
  (0.828)  (0.455)  (0.154) 
Std_AF + -0.000  0.001**  0.002*** 
  (0.506)  (0.032)  (0.006) 
News - -0.270***  -0.262***  -0.256*** 
  (0.005)  (0.002)  (0.000) 
Horizon + 0.000***  0.000***  0.000*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
Litigation - -0.004  -0.007**  -0.004 
  (0.182)  (0.041)  (0.141) 
High Tech ? -0.001  0.000  -0.001 
  (0.749)  (0.995)  (0.709) 
Weak + 0.003  0.004  0.004 
  (0.183)  (0.190)  (0.170) 
Year Indicators  Included  Included  Included 
Number of 
observations 
 3,529  3,529 
 
3,529 
Adjusted R2  0.311  0.323  0.342 
F-Statistic   8.780***   10.810***   11.020*** 
The dependent variable is forecast error measured as the absolute value of management 
forecast error, (realized earnings less the management forecast amount)/lagged stock price.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The p-values are listed in parentheses under the coefficient.  
The sample for column 1 only includes the first annual forecast for each company year.  The 
sample for column 2 only includes the most recent annual forecast made before earnings are 
announced.  All of the variables for column 3, including the dependent variable, are the 
averages for each company year.  The models are estimated using ordinary least squares 
regressions with robust standard errors clustered by company. 
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Table 7 
Other Forecasting Attributes 
Panel A  Column 1  Column 2 
Variables Pred Frequency   Precision 
Intercept 1 ? 0.352  -8.204*** 
  (0.444)  (0.000) 
Intercept 2 ?   -3.694*** 
    (0.000) 
Intercept 3 ?   2.273*** 
    (0.000) 
IT Expert + -0.275  0.252 
  (0.840)  (0.208) 
Financial Exp + -0.204  -0.199 
  (0.887)  (0.926) 
LnAT + 0.259***  0.028 
  (0.000)  (0.329) 
Loss - -0.277  0.472 
  (0.139)  (0.996) 
Leverage - 1.521  -0.713** 
  (0.999)  (0.030) 
EarnVol - 0.406  0.000 
  (0.608)  (0.976) 
CFOVol - -1.795  -0.000 
  (0.234)  (0.300) 
Year Indicators  Included  Included 
Number of observations  3,882  18,151 
Adjusted or Pseudo R2  0.081  0.007 
F-Statistic or Chi2 Statistic  9.931***  35.240** 
The dependent variable for column 1 is the number of annual forecasts the firm makes for 
fiscal year t.  The dependent variable for column 2 is set to 3 if the forecast is a point forecast, 
2 if a range forecast, 1 if an open-ended forecast, and 0 otherwise.  The dependent variable for 
column 3 is set to 1 if the forecast is a point forecast and 0 otherwise.  The dependent variable 
is the forecast bias of the management forecast, (realized earnings less the management 
forecast) / lagged stock price.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The p-values are listed in 
parentheses under the coefficient.  The sample for column 1 includes all available firm year 
observations.  The sample for columns 2-4 includes all forecasts with the necessary data.  The 
model for columns 1 and 4 are estimated using ordinary least squares regressions. Column 2 
utilizes and ordered logistic regression.  Column 3 utilizes a logistic regression.  All models 
are estimated with robust standard errors clustered by firm. 
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Table 7 
Other Forecasting Attributes 
Panel B  Column 1  Column 2 
Variables Pred Frequency   Precision 
Growth - 0.317  0.339 
  (0.866)  (0.924) 
IndCon + 3.300**  0.943* 
  (0.014)  (0.073) 
Big4 ? -0.031  -0.175 
  (0.889)  (0.471) 
LnAnalysts + 0.570***  0.109 
  (0.000)  (0.125) 
Std_AF - -0.062**  0.021 
  (0.032)  (0.876) 
High Tech ? -0.352**  -0.046 
  (0.035)  (0.754) 
News -   0.210 
    (0.830) 
Horizon -   -0.000 
    (0.246) 
Year Indicators  Included  Included 
Number of observations  3,882  18,151 
Adjusted or Pseudo R2  0.081  0.007 
F-Statistic or Chi2 Statistic  9.931***  35.240** 
The dependent variable for column 1 is the number of annual forecasts the firm makes for 
fiscal year t.  The dependent variable for column 2 is set to 3 if the forecast is a point forecast, 
2 if a range forecast, 1 if an open-ended forecast, and 0 otherwise.  The dependent variable for 
column 3 is set to 1 if the forecast is a point forecast and 0 otherwise.  The dependent variable 
is the forecast bias of the management forecast, (realized earnings less the management 
forecast) / lagged stock price.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The p-values are listed in 
parentheses under the coefficient.  The sample for column 1 includes all available firm year 
observations.  The sample for columns 2-4 includes all forecasts with the necessary data.  The 
model for columns 1 and 4 are estimated using ordinary least squares regressions. Column 2 
utilizes and ordered logistic regression.  Column 3 utilizes a logistic regression.  All models 
are estimated with robust standard errors clustered by firm. 
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Table 7 
Other Forecasting Attributes 
  Column 3  Column 4 
Variables Pred PointF   Bias 
Intercept ? -2.546***  0.015*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
IT Expert + 0.403  -0.001 
  (0.136)  (0.340) 
Financial Exp + -0.239  0.001 
  (0.880)  (0.746) 
LnAT + 0.072  -0.001* 
  (0.188)  (0.071) 
Loss - 0.461  0.027*** 
  (0.983)  (0.000) 
Leverage - -0.978**  0.000 
  (0.043)  (0.945) 
EarnVol - 0.000  -0.014 
  (0.995)  (0.290) 
CFOVol - -0.000  -0.002 
  (0.375)  (0.943) 
Year Indicators  Included  Included 
Number of observations  18,151  16,899 
Adjusted or Pseudo R2  0.016  0.361 
F-Statistic or Chi2 Statistic  45.460***  12.998*** 
The dependent variable for column 1 is the number of annual forecasts the firm makes for 
fiscal year t.  The dependent variable for column 2 is set to 3 if the forecast is a point forecast, 
2 if a range forecast, 1 if an open-ended forecast, and 0 otherwise.  The dependent variable for 
column 3 is set to 1 if the forecast is a point forecast and 0 otherwise.  The dependent variable 
is the forecast bias of the management forecast, (realized earnings less the management 
forecast) / lagged stock price.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The p-values are listed in 
parentheses under the coefficient.  The sample for column 1 includes all available firm year 
observations.  The sample for columns 2-4 includes all forecasts with the necessary data.  The 
model for columns 1 and 4 are estimated using ordinary least squares regressions. Column 2 
utilizes and ordered logistic regression.  Column 3 utilizes a logistic regression.  All models 
are estimated with robust standard errors clustered by firm. 
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Table 7 
Other Forecasting Attributes 
Panel D  Column 3  Column 4 
Variables Pred PointF   Bias 
Growth - 0.540  -0.016*** 
  (0.982)  (0.000) 
IndCon + 0.985  -0.006 
  (0.113)  (0.340) 
Big4 ? -0.129  0.002 
  (0.708)  (0.312) 
LnAnalysts + 0.145  -0.001 
  (0.144)  (0.390) 
Std_AF - 0.026  0.000 
  (0.910)  (0.929) 
High Tech ? -0.049  -0.003** 
  (0.785)  (0.019) 
News - 0.771  0.327*** 
  (0.777)  (0.001) 
Horizon - -0.001  0.000*** 
  (0.229)  (0.000) 
Year Indicators  Included  Included 
Number of observations  18,151  16,899 
Adjusted or Pseudo R2  0.016  0.361 
F-Statistic or Chi2 Statistic  45.460***  12.998*** 
The dependent variable for column 1 is the number of annual forecasts the firm makes for 
fiscal year t.  The dependent variable for column 2 is set to 3 if the forecast is a point forecast, 
2 if a range forecast, 1 if an open-ended forecast, and 0 otherwise.  The dependent variable for 
column 3 is set to 1 if the forecast is a point forecast and 0 otherwise.  The dependent variable 
is the forecast bias of the management forecast, (realized earnings less the management 
forecast) / lagged stock price.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The p-values are listed in 
parentheses under the coefficient.  The sample for column 1 includes all available firm year 
observations.  The sample for columns 2-4 includes all forecasts with the necessary data.  The 
model for columns 1 and 4 are estimated using ordinary least squares regressions. Column 2 
utilizes and ordered logistic regression.  Column 3 utilizes a logistic regression.  All models 
are estimated with robust standard errors clustered by firm. 
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Table 8 
Earnings Management  
Panel A  Column 1  Column 2  Column 3 
Variables Pred Just Beat   
Just Beating 
Using DAs 
  Misstatement 
Intercept ? -1.155**  -2.222***  -0.926 
  (0.021)  (0.000)  (0.212) 
IT Expert ? 0.240  -0.199  -1.161* 
  (0.515)  (0.702)  (0.061) 
Financial EXP ? 0.086  0.330  -0.162 
  (0.624)  (0.144)  (0.544) 
LnAT - -0.021  0.067  -0.131* 
  (0.341)  (0.877)  (0.067) 
ROA +/- 1.694**  2.329  0.370 
  (0.036)  (0.966)  (0.632) 
Leverage + -0.435  -0.084  -0.354 
  (0.863)  (0.569)  (0.705) 
Loss -/+ 0.233  0.318  0.307 
  (0.792)  (0.834)  (0.158) 
Return - -0.646***  -0.547**  -0.517** 
  (0.000)  (0.016)  (0.017) 
Year Indicators  Included  Included  Included 
Number of 
observations 
 3,003  1,593 
 
3,529 
Pseudo R2  0.035  0.041  0.039 
Chi2 Statistic   72.170***   40.360***   54.400*** 
The dependent variable for column 1 is coded as a 1 if the firm reported earnings than were 
just above (between 0 and 0.02) the management forecast, and 0 otherwise.  The dependent 
variable for column 2 is coded as a 1 if the firm reported earnings that just above (between 0 
and 0.02) the management forecast and their earnings before considering discretionary 
accruals were below the forecast, and 0 otherwise.  The dependent variable for column 3 is 
coded as 1 if the firm has a material misstatement in year t, and 0 otherwise.  *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.10. The p-values are listed in parentheses under the coefficient.  The sample 
for column 1 only includes the most recent forecast for each firm with all necessary data.  The 
sample for column 2 only includes the most recent annual forecast made before earnings are 
announced, and is limited to firms whose earnings before discretionary accruals are less than 
0.02 above the management forecast.  The sample for column 3 includes all available firm 
year observation.  The models are estimated using logistic regressions with robust standard 
errors clustered by firm. 
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Table 8 
Earnings Management  
Panel B  Column 1  Column 2  Column 3 
Variables Pred Just Beat   
Just Beating 
Using DAs 
  Misstatement 
CFO - -0.374  -0.879  -1.213 
  (0.358)  (0.257)  (0.209) 
Merger + 0.046  0.124  -0.065 
  (0.397)  (0.283)  (0.617) 
CFOVol + -3.913  -1.433  1.770 
  (0.896)  (0.619)  (0.343) 
EarnVol + 0.969  0.512  -7.374 
  (0.229)  (0.441)  (0.967) 
Big4 - 0.314  0.201  0.613 
  (0.864)  (0.712)  (0.915) 
Horizon - -0.005***  -0.005***   
  (0.000)  (0.000)   
High Tech ? 0.131  0.454**  0.492** 
  (0.414)  (0.030)  (0.042) 
Year Indicators  Included  Included  Included 
Number of 
observations 
 3,003  1,593 
 
3,529 
Pseudo R2  0.035  0.041  0.039 
Chi2 Statistic   72.170***   40.360***   54.400*** 
The dependent variable for column 1 is coded as a 1 if the firm reported earnings than were 
just above (between 0 and 0.02) the management forecast, and 0 otherwise.  The dependent 
variable for column 2 is coded as a 1 if the firm reported earnings that just above (between 0 
and 0.02) the management forecast and their earnings before considering discretionary 
accruals were below the forecast, and 0 otherwise.  The dependent variable for column 3 is 
coded as 1 if the firm has a material misstatement in year t, and 0 otherwise.  *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.10. The p-values are listed in parentheses under the coefficient.  The sample 
for column 1 only includes the most recent forecast for each firm with all necessary data.  The 
sample for column 2 only includes the most recent annual forecast made before earnings are 
announced, and is limited to firms whose earnings before discretionary accruals are less than 
0.02 above the management forecast.  The sample for column 3 includes all available firm 
year observation.  The models are estimated using logistic regressions with robust standard 
errors clustered by firm. 
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Table 9 
Analyst Forecast Revisions Following Management Forecasts 
   Column 1  Column 2 
Panel A Pred   Revise   RevisionAmount 
Intercept   2.257***  0.034 
   (0.000)  (0.360) 
IT Expert +  0.893***  0.000 
   (0.004)  (0.467) 
News +  -1.071  -0.133 
   (0.858)  (0.859) 
Down +  -0.372  0.001*** 
   (0.999)  (0.000) 
Horizon +  0.002***  0.000 
   (0.000)  (0.411) 
LnAnalysts ?  0.689***  -0.003*** 
   (0.000)  (0.000) 
Range -  40.429  -0.408 
   (0.996)  (0.173) 
Loss -  0.131  0.001 
   (0.759)  (0.673) 
LnAT ?  -0.137***  0.000* 
   (0.001)  (0.101) 
Year Indicators   Included  Included 
Number of observations   16,899  16,899 
Adjusted or Psuedo R2   0.031  0.130 
F-Statistic or Chi2 
Statistic 
    209.010***   28.110*** 
The dependent variable for column 1 an indicator variable coded one if there is a revision 
to the consensus analyst forecast within 15 days following the management forecast, and 
zero otherwise.  The dependent variable for column 2 is the amount of the analyst forecast 
revision 15 days following the management forecast scaled by lagged stock price.  p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The p-values are listed in parentheses under the coefficient.  The 
sample for both of the columns utilizes all management forecasts with the necessary data.  
The model for column 1 utilizes a logistic regression.  The model for column 2 is estimated 
using an ordinary least squares regression. All models are estimated with robust standard 
errors clustered by firm. 
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Table 9 
Analyst Forecast Revisions Following Management Forecasts 
   Column 1  Column 2 
Panel B Pred   Revise   RevisionAmount 
News*IT Expert +    0.138* 
     (0.092) 
News*Down +    -0.025 
     (0.860) 
News*Horizon +    -0.000 
     (0.619) 
News*LnAnalysts ?    0.107*** 
     (0.006) 
News*Range -    0.465 
     (0.757) 
News*Loss -    -0.208*** 
     (0.000) 
News*LnAT ?    -0.014** 
     (0.017) 
Year Indicators   Included  Included 
Number of observations   16,899  16,899 
Adjusted or Pseudo R2   0.031  0.130 
F-Statistic or Chi2 
Statistic 
    209.010***   28.110*** 
The dependent variable for column 1 an indicator variable coded one if there is a revision 
to the consensus analyst forecast within 15 days following the management forecast, and 
zero otherwise.  The dependent variable for column 2 is the amount of the analyst forecast 
revision 15 days following the management forecast scaled by lagged stock price.  p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The p-values are listed in parentheses under the coefficient.  The 
sample for both of the columns utilizes all management forecasts with the necessary data.  
The model for column 1 utilizes a logistic regression.  The model for column 2 is estimated 
using an ordinary least squares regression. All models are estimated with robust standard 
errors clustered by firm. 
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Table 9 
Analyst Forecast Revisions Following Management Forecasts 
 
  
Column 3 
 Panel C Pred   AFE_Post 
Intercept   0.019*** 
   (0.001) 
IT Expert -  -0.003** 
   (0.025) 
Horizon +  0.000*** 
   (0.002) 
LnAnalysts -  -0.003** 
   (0.049) 
Range +  0.959** 
   (0.017) 
Loss +  0.013*** 
   (0.005) 
LnAT -  0.000 
   (0.800) 
RevisionAmount +  -0.204 
   (0.790) 
ROA ?  -0.076*** 
   (0.002) 
Merger +  -0.002 
   (0.939) 
Foreign +  0.000 
   (0.485) 
Std_AF_Post +  0.332 
   (0.192) 
Year Indicators   Included 
Number of observations   16,899 
Adjusted R2   0.126 
F-Statistic     15.480*** 
The dependent variable is the analyst forecast error based on the median consensus 
forecast 15 days following the management forecast scaled by lagged stock price.   
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The p-values are listed in parentheses under the 
coefficient.  The sample utilizes all management forecasts with the necessary data.  
The model is estimated using an ordinary least squares regression. The model is 
estimated with robust standard errors clustered by firm. 
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Table 10 
Self-Selection Bias 
Panel A Column 1  Column 2  Column 3 
Variables IT Expert   IT Expert   IT Expert 
Intercept -1.266***  -1.447***  -0.308 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.408) 
LnAT -0.083***  -0.057  0.013 
 (0.000)  (0.113)  (0.737) 
ROA 1.058***  0.544  1.174* 
 (0.002)  (0.422)  (0.059) 
Leverage -0.440***  -0.583**  0.130 
 (0.000)  (0.024)  (0.555) 
High Tech 0.365***  0.402***  0.145 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.181) 
CIO 0.173***  0.208*  0.367*** 
 (0.003)  (0.073)  (0.002) 
ITWeak 0.058  0.175  0.027 
 (0.848)  (0.720)  (0.964) 
SalesVol 0.003*  0.001  0.091*** 
 (0.095)  (0.761)  (0.002) 
Number of observations 16,899  3,529  900 
Pseudo R2 0.103  0.091  0.066 
Chi2 Statistic 439.500***   91.590***   83.810*** 
The dependent variable is an indicator variable coded as one if the company employs a 
CEO with IT Expertise in year t, and zero otherwise.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
The p-values are listed in parentheses under the coefficient.  The sample for column 1 
includes all available forecasts.  All of the variables for column 2, including the 
dependent variable, are the averages for each company year. The sample for column 3 
utilizes a matched sample as discussed in the research design section.  The models are 
estimated using ordinary least squares regressions. 
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Table 10 
Self-Selection Bias 
Panel B Column 1  Column 2  Column 3 
Variables IT Expert   IT Expert   IT Expert 
Std_Return 0.012  0.013  0.364 
 (0.790)  (0.869)  (0.135) 
Foreign 0.077*  0.069  0.012 
 (0.090)  (0.459)  (0.902) 
Merger -0.274***  -0.257*  -0.502*** 
 (0.000)  (0.065)  (0.000) 
Restruct -0.060  -0.023  -0.248** 
 (0.208)  (0.818)  (0.014) 
Product_Diff 0.598**  0.642  0.494 
 (0.028)  (0.257)  (0.361) 
Cost_Leader -0.194***  -0.097  -0.179* 
 (0.001)  (0.348)  (0.067) 
Transform 0.351***  0.283***  -0.036 
 (0.000)  (0.005)  (0.725) 
Number of observations 16,899  3,529  900 
Pseudo R2 0.103  0.091  0.066 
Chi2 Statistic 439.500***   91.590***   83.810*** 
The dependent variable is an indicator variable coded as one if the company employs a 
CEO with IT Expertise in year t, and zero otherwise.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
The p-values are listed in parentheses under the coefficient.  The sample for column 1 
includes all available forecasts.  All of the variables for column 2, including the 
dependent variable, are the averages for each company year. The sample for column 3 
utilizes a matched sample as discussed in the research design section.  The models are 
estimated using ordinary least squares regressions. 
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Table 10 
Self-Selection Bias 
Panel C  Column 1  Column 2  Column 3 
Variables Pred 
Absolute 
Forecast 
Error 
  
Absolute 
Forecast 
Error 
  
Absolute 
Forecast 
Error 
Intercept ? 0.008  0.004  0.009* 
  (0.131)  (0.679)  (0.052) 
IT Expert - -0.004**  -0.004**  -0.002*** 
  (0.016)  (0.043)  (0.007) 
Financial Exp - -0.001  -0.001  -0.002** 
  (0.267)  (0.248)  (0.050) 
LnAT - -0.002*  -0.001*  -0.000 
  (0.026)  (0.089)  (0.173) 
ROA - -0.068***  -0.093***  -0.014* 
  (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.120) 
Loss + 0.007**  0.014**  0.007 
  (0.028)  (0.005)  (0.106) 
Leverage + -0.002  -0.004  -0.002 
  (0.743)  (0.835)  (0.882) 
EarnVol + -0.002  -0.008  0.004 
  (0.551)  (0.690)  (0.314) 
CFOVol + 0.039  0.051  0.007 
  (0.160)  (0.129)  (0.316) 
Year Indicators  Included  Included  Included 
Number of observations  16,899  3,529  900 
Adjusted R2  0.332  0.343  0.252 
F-Statistic   6.930***   10.870***  7.930*** 
The dependent variable is forecast error measured as the absolute value of management 
forecast error, (realized earnings less the management forecast amount)/lagged stock price.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The p-values are listed in parentheses under the 
coefficient.  The sample for column 1 includes all available forecasts.  All of the variables 
for column 2, including the dependent variable, are the averages for each company year. The 
sample for column 3 utilizes a matched sample as discussed in the research design section.  
The models are estimated using ordinary least squares regressions with robust standard 
errors clustered by company. 
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Table 10 
Self-Selection Bias 
Panel D  Column 1  Column 2  Column 3 
Variables Pred 
Absolute 
Forecast 
Error 
  
Absolute 
Forecast 
Error 
  
Absolute 
Forecast 
Error 
Growth + -0.005  -0.004  -0.004 
  (0.978)  (0.853)  (0.784) 
IndCon - -0.003  -0.002  0.034 
  (0.318)  (0.378)  (0.250) 
Big4 ? 0.004***  0.005***  -0.001 
  (0.007)  (0.016)  (0.598) 
LnAnalysts - 0.000  -0.001  -0.001** 
  (0.560)  (0.157)  (0.092) 
Std_AF + 0.001  0.002  0.019*** 
  (0.213)  (0.006)  (0.001) 
News - -0.281***  -0.256***  0.295*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.998) 
Horizon + 0.000***  0.000***  0.000*** 
  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Litigation - -0.004**  -0.004**  0.001 
  (0.058)  (0.157)  (0.767) 
High Tech ? 0.001  0.001  -0.001 
  (0.751)  (0.803)  (0.396) 
Weak + 0.008**  0.005**  -0.000 
  (0.047)  (0.158)  (0.555) 
IMR ? 0.006**  0.006  0.004 
  (0.012)  (0.216)  (0.192) 
Year Indicators  Included  Included  Included 
Number of observations  16,899  3,529  900 
Adjusted R2  0.332  0.343  0.252 
F-Statistic   6.930***   10.870***  7.930*** 
The dependent variable is forecast error measured as the absolute value of management 
forecast error, (realized earnings less the management forecast amount)/lagged stock price.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The p-values are listed in parentheses under the 
coefficient.  The sample for column 1 includes all available forecasts.  All of the variables 
for column 2, including the dependent variable, are the averages for each company year. The 
sample for column 3 utilizes a matched sample as discussed in the research design section.  
The models are estimated using ordinary least squares regressions with robust standard 
errors clustered by company. 
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Table 11 
Quarterly Forecasts 
Panel A  Column 1  Column 2 
Variables Pred 
Issued Quarterly 
Forecast 
  Absolute Forecast Error 
Intercept  1.326***  0.001 
  (0.004)  (0.622) 
IT Expert +/- 0.348  -0.001** 
  (0.170)  (0.027) 
Financial Exp +/- -0.024  -0.001*** 
  (0.558)  (0.005) 
LnAT +/- -0.001  0.000 
  (0.506)  (0.914) 
ROA -   -0.006* 
    (0.069) 
Loss -/+ -0.005  0.000 
  (0.487)  (0.348) 
Leverage -/+ -0.904***  -0.000 
  (0.007)  (0.646) 
EarnVol -/+ -1.114  0.000 
  (0.245)  (0.471) 
CFOVol -/+ 0.596  0.022** 
  (0.589)  (0.049) 
Year Indicators  Included  Included 
Number of observations  3,529  8,036 
Adjusted or Pseudo R2  0.028  0.493 
F-Statistic or Chi2 
Statistic 
  95.090***   10.870*** 
The dependent variable in column 1 is an indicator coded as one if the firm issues any 
quarterly forecasts in year t and zero otherwise.  The dependent variable in column 2 is 
forecast error measured as the absolute value of management forecast error, (realized earnings 
less the management forecast amount)/lagged stock price.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
The p-values are listed in parentheses under the coefficient.  The sample for column 1 only 
includes all firm year observations.  The sample for column 2 includes all available quarterly 
forecasts.  The model in column 1 utilizes a logistic regression.  The model in column 2 is 
estimated using an ordinary least squares regression.  Both models are estimated with robust 
standard errors clustered by company. 
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Table 11 
Quarterly Forecasts 
Panel B  Column 1  Column 2 
Variables Pred 
Issued Quarterly 
Forecast 
  Absolute Forecast Error 
Growth -/+ -0.021  0.003** 
  (0.465)  (0.036) 
IndCon +/- -1.967  0.003 
  (0.992)  (0.762) 
Big4 ? 0.216  0.002*** 
  (0.429)  (0.001) 
LnAnalysts -   -0.001*** 
    (0.000) 
Std_AF +   0.005 
    (0.386) 
News -   -0.468*** 
    (0.000) 
Horizon +   0.000*** 
    (0.004) 
Litigation -   0.000 
    (0.570) 
High Tech ? 0.005  -0.002** 
  (0.971)  (0.024) 
Weak +   -0.000 
    (0.652) 
Year Indicators  Included  Included 
Number of observations  3,529  8,036 
Adjusted or Pseudo R2  0.028  0.493 
F-Statistic or Chi2 
Statistic 
  95.090***   10.870*** 
The dependent variable in column 1 is an indicator coded as one if the firm issues any 
quarterly forecasts in year t and zero otherwise.  The dependent variable in column 2 is 
forecast error measured as the absolute value of management forecast error, (realized earnings 
less the management forecast amount)/lagged stock price.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
The p-values are listed in parentheses under the coefficient.  The sample for column 1 only 
includes all firm year observations.  The sample for column 2 includes all available quarterly 
forecasts.  The model in column 1 utilizes a logistic regression.  The model in column 2 is 
estimated using an ordinary least squares regression.  Both models are estimated with robust 
standard errors clustered by company. 
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Table 11 
Quarterly Forecasts 
Panel C  Column 1  Column 2 
Variables Pred 
Absolute Forecast 
Error 
  
Absolute Forecast 
Error 
Intercept ? 0.003*  0.000 
  (0.082)  (0.917) 
IT Expert - -0.000  -0.001** 
  (0.233)  (0.033) 
Financial Exp - -0.000  -0.001** 
  (0.346)  (0.039) 
LnAT - 0.000  0.001 
  (0.992)  (0.935) 
ROA - -0.006**  -0.004 
  (0.023)  (0.195) 
Loss + -0.003  0.003 
  (0.136)  (0.127) 
Leverage + -0.001  -0.001 
  (0.891)  (0.689) 
EarnVol + 0.009*  -0.001 
  (0.079)  (0.573) 
CFOVol + 0.016  0.011 
  (0.118)  (0.248) 
Year Indicators  Included  Included 
Number of observations  1,927  2,085 
Adjusted R2  0.308  0.649 
F-Statistic   3.317***   51.666*** 
The dependent variable is forecast error measured as the absolute value of management 
forecast error, (realized earnings less the management forecast amount)/lagged stock price.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The p-values are listed in parentheses under the coefficient.  
The sample for each column uses forecasts for each fiscal quarter (column 1 is for Q1, 
column 2 is for Q2, and so forth).  The models are estimated using an ordinary least squares 
regression with robust standard errors clustered by company. 
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Table 11 
Quarterly Forecasts 
Panel D  Column 1  Column 2 
Variables Pred 
Absolute Forecast 
Error 
  
Absolute Forecast 
Error 
Growth + 0.003*  0.004*** 
  (0.099)  (0.003) 
IndCon - -0.002  -0.004 
  (0.271)  (0.203) 
Big4 ? 0.000  0.002*** 
  (0.647)  (0.002) 
LnAnalysts - -0.001***  -0.002*** 
  (0.000)  (0.007) 
Std_AF + 0.031***  0.027* 
  (0.008)  (0.068) 
News - -0.414**  -0.470*** 
  (0.039)  (0.000) 
Horizon + -0.000  0.000 
  (0.923)  (0.170) 
Litigation - 0.000  0.001 
  (0.657)  (0.811) 
High Tech ? -0.001*  -0.002** 
  (0.081)  (0.021) 
Weak + -0.000  0.001 
  (0.676)  (0.297) 
Year Indicators  Included  Included 
Number of observations  1,927  2,085 
Adjusted R2  0.308  0.649 
F-Statistic   3.317***   51.666*** 
The dependent variable is forecast error measured as the absolute value of management 
forecast error, (realized earnings less the management forecast amount)/lagged stock price.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The p-values are listed in parentheses under the coefficient.  
The sample for each column uses forecasts for each fiscal quarter (column 1 is for Q1, 
column 2 is for Q2, and so forth).  The models are estimated using an ordinary least squares 
regression with robust standard errors clustered by company. 
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Table 11 
Quarterly Forecasts 
Panel E  Column 3  Column 4 
Variables Pred 
Absolute Forecast 
Error   
Absolute Forecast 
Error 
Intercept ? -0.000  0.002 
  (0.963)  (0.499) 
IT Expert - -0.001**  -0.001* 
  (0.032)  (0.093) 
Financial Exp - -0.001**  -0.003*** 
  (0.019)  (0.008) 
LnAT - 0.001  0.000 
  (0.937)  (0.703) 
ROA - -0.002  -0.006 
  (0.328)  (0.220) 
Loss + 0.001  0.001 
  (0.127)  (0.387) 
Leverage + 0.000  -0.002 
  (0.426)  (0.721) 
EarnVol + -0.002  -0.008 
  (0.616)  (0.708) 
CFOVol + 0.016  0.047** 
  (0.136)  (0.040) 
Year Indicators  Included  Included 
Number of observations  2,081  1,937 
Adjusted R2  0.745  0.181 
F-Statistic   6.888***  4.299*** 
The dependent variable is forecast error measured as the absolute value of management 
forecast error, (realized earnings less the management forecast amount)/lagged stock price.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The p-values are listed in parentheses under the coefficient.  
The sample for each column uses forecasts for each fiscal quarter (column 1 is for Q1, 
column 2 is for Q2, and so forth).  The models are estimated using an ordinary least squares 
regression with robust standard errors clustered by company. 
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Table 11 
Quarterly Forecasts 
Panel F  Column 3  Column 4 
Variables Pred 
Absolute Forecast 
Error   
Absolute Forecast 
Error 
Growth + 0.005**  0.002 
  (0.038)  (0.242) 
IndCon - 0.002  0.020 
  (0.622)  (0.992) 
Big4 ? 0.001  0.004*** 
  (0.362)  (0.010) 
LnAnalysts - -0.001**  -0.002*** 
  (0.010)  (0.005) 
Std_AF + -0.036  0.045** 
  (0.747)  (0.024) 
News - -0.549***  -0.528*** 
  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Horizon + 0.000***  0.000 
  (0.003)  (0.228) 
Litigation - -0.000  0.000 
  (0.301)  (0.616) 
High Tech ? -0.001  -0.002 
  (0.124)  (0.127) 
Weak + -0.001  -0.002 
  (0.818)  (0.959) 
Year Indicators  Included  Included 
Number of observations  2,081  1,937 
Adjusted R2  0.745  0.181 
F-Statistic   6.888***  4.299*** 
The dependent variable is forecast error measured as the absolute value of management 
forecast error, (realized earnings less the management forecast amount)/lagged stock price.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The p-values are listed in parentheses under the coefficient.  
The sample for each column uses forecasts for each fiscal quarter (column 1 is for Q1, 
column 2 is for Q2, and so forth).  The models are estimated using an ordinary least squares 
regression with robust standard errors clustered by company. 
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Table 12 
Presence of CIO 
Panel A  Column 1  Column 2  Column 3 
Variables Pred 
Absolute 
Forecast 
Error 
  
Absolute 
Forecast 
Error 
  
Absolute 
Forecast 
Error 
Intercept  0.018***  0.014***  0.013*** 
  (0.000)  (0.007)  (0.001) 
IT Expert - -0.004***  -0.004**  -0.002*** 
  (0.005)  (0.023)  (0.004) 
CIO - -0.000  0.001  -0.001 
  (0.432)  (0.342)  (0.156) 
Financial Exp - -0.001  -0.002  -0.002** 
  (0.199)  (0.197)  (0.038) 
LnAT - -0.001*  -0.001  -0.001 
  (0.068)  (0.143)  (0.157) 
ROA - -0.076***  -0.097***  -0.017* 
  (0.002)  (0.005)  (0.078) 
Loss + 0.008**  0.014***  0.007 
  (0.021)  (0.005)  (0.105) 
Leverage + 0.000  -0.001  -0.001 
  (0.449)  (0.644)  (0.766) 
EarnVol + -0.004  -0.008  0.003 
  (0.611)  (0.705)  (0.365) 
CFOVol + 0.046  0.054  0.005 
  (0.114)  (0.113)  (0.380) 
Year Indicators  Included  Included  Included 
Number of observations  16,899  3,529  900 
Adjusted R2  0.330  0.342  0.250 
F-Statistic   7.200***   10.940***   8.200*** 
The dependent variable is forecast error measured as the absolute value of management 
forecast error, (realized earnings less the management forecast amount)/lagged stock price.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The p-values are listed in parentheses under the 
coefficient.  The sample for column 1 includes all available forecasts.  All of the variables 
for column 2, including the dependent variable, are the averages for each company year. The 
sample for column 3 utilizes a matched sample as discussed in the research design section.  
The models are estimated using ordinary least squares regressions with robust standard 
errors clustered by company. 
 77 
Table 12 
Presence of CIO 
Panel B  Column 1  Column 2  Column 3 
Variables Pred 
Absolute 
Forecast 
Error 
  
Absolute 
Forecast 
Error 
  
Absolute 
Forecast 
Error 
Growth + -0.005  -0.004  -0.004 
  (0.978)  (0.834)  (0.808) 
IndCon - -0.003  -0.002  0.034 
  (0.324)  (0.403)  (0.749) 
Big4 ? 0.004***  0.005**  -0.001 
  (0.007)  (0.017)  (0.633) 
LnAnalysts - 0.000  -0.001  -0.001* 
  (0.576)  (0.134)  (0.055) 
Std_AF + 0.001  0.002***  0.019*** 
  (0.202)  (0.006)  (0.001) 
News - -0.279***  -0.255***  0.303 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.998) 
Horizon + 0.000***  0.000***  0.000*** 
  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Litigation - -0.005**  -0.004  0.002 
  (0.033)  (0.136)  (0.804) 
High Tech ? -0.002  -0.001  -0.002 
  (0.484)  (0.696)  (0.203) 
Weak + 0.008**  0.004  -0.000 
  (0.044)  (0.177)  (0.560) 
Year Indicators  Included  Included  Included 
Number of observations  16,899  3,529  900 
Adjusted R2  0.330  0.342  0.250 
F-Statistic   7.200***   10.940***   8.200*** 
The dependent variable is forecast error measured as the absolute value of management 
forecast error, (realized earnings less the management forecast amount)/lagged stock price.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The p-values are listed in parentheses under the 
coefficient.  The sample for column 1 includes all available forecasts.  All of the variables 
for column 2, including the dependent variable, are the averages for each company year. 
The sample for column 3 utilizes a matched sample as discussed in the research design 
section.  The models are estimated using ordinary least squares regressions with robust 
standard errors clustered by company. 
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Table 13 
Likelihood of a Material Weakness in Internal Controls 
  Column 1  Column 2  Column 3 
Variables Pred Weakness   IT Weakness   
Non-IT 
Weakness 
Intercept  -0.180  -1.095  -0.764 
  (0.802)  (0.328)  (0.332) 
IT Expert - -0.457  0.059  -0.616 
  (0.202)  (0.530)  (0.195) 
Financial Exp - 0.012  0.200  -0.024 
  (0.518)  (0.633)  (0.464) 
LnAT - -0.246***  -0.444***  -0.209** 
  (0.006)  (0.003)  (0.022) 
ROA - -3.232***  -1.314  -3.162*** 
  (0.002)  (0.207)  (0.004) 
Big4 - -0.498**  -1.480***  -0.150 
  (0.049)  (0.004)  (0.341) 
Leverage + 0.766*  1.783**  0.526 
  (0.059)  (0.014)  (0.163) 
Loss + 0.564**  0.645  0.568** 
  (0.043)  (0.213)  (0.048) 
Growth + -0.151  0.070  -0.189 
  (0.636)  (0.460)  (0.648) 
Segment + 0.011  0.018  0.010 
  (0.292)  (0.325)  (0.312) 
Foreign + 0.419**  0.866**  0.321* 
  (0.013)  (0.032)  (0.054) 
Merger + 0.103  0.459  0.036 
  (0.345)  (0.214)  (0.448) 
Hightech ? 0.538**  0.208  0.563** 
  (0.029)  (0.709)  (0.023) 
Year Indicators  Included  Included  Included 
Number of observations  3,529  3,529  3,529 
Pseudo R2  0.142  0.118  0.139 
Chi2 Statistic   156.640***   74.810***   146.890*** 
The dependent variable is coded as a 1 if the company reported a material weakness of the 
specified type in year t, and 0 otherwise.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The p-values 
are listed in parentheses under the coefficient.  The sample for all of the columns includes 
all available company-year observations.  The models are estimated using logistic 
regressions with robust standard errors clustered by company. 
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Table 14 
Management Earnings Forecast Error and Material Weaknesses in Internal Controls 
Panel A: Variables of Interest Column 1  Column 2 
Variables Pred 
Absolute 
Forecast Error 
  
Absolute 
Forecast Error 
IT Expert - -0.004***  -0.004*** 
  (0.013)  (0.007) 
Weak + 0.009**   
  (0.037)   
Weak*IT Expert ? -0.032***   
  (0.050)   
ITWeak +   0.008 
    (0.169) 
ITWeak*IT Expert ?   -0.098*** 
    (0.000) 
NonITWeak +    
     
NonITWeak*IT Expert ?    
     
Test Weak + Weak * IT 
Expert = 0 
 2.370   
 (0.124)   
Test ITWeak + ITWeak * IT 
Expert = 0 
   19.640*** 
   (0.000) 
Test NonITWeak + 
NonITWeak * IT Expert = 0 
    
    
The dependent variable is forecast error measured as the absolute value of management 
forecast error, (realized earnings less the management forecast amount)/lagged stock price.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The p-values are listed in parentheses under the 
coefficient.  The sample for all of the columns includes all available forecasts.  The models 
are estimated using ordinary least squares regressions with robust standard errors clustered 
by company. 
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Table 14 
Management Earnings Forecast Error and Material Weaknesses in Internal Controls 
Panel A Cont.: Variables of Interest Column 3  Column 4 
Variables Pred 
Absolute 
Forecast Error   
Absolute 
Forecast Error 
IT Expert - -0.004***  -0.004*** 
  (0.008)  (0.014) 
Weak +    
     
Weak*IT Expert ?    
     
ITWeak +   0.009 
    (0.150) 
ITWeak*IT Expert ?   -0.097*** 
    (0.000) 
NonITWeak + 0.009*  0.009* 
  (0.058)  (0.058) 
NonITWeak*IT Expert ? -0.016**  -0.016** 
  (0.031)  (0.027) 
Test Weak + Weak * IT 
Expert = 0 
    
    
Test ITWeak + ITWeak * IT 
Expert = 0 
   19.620*** 
   (0.000) 
Test NonITWeak + 
NonITWeak * IT Expert = 0 
 1.340  1.510 
 (0.247)  (0.219) 
The dependent variable is forecast error measured as the absolute value of management 
forecast error, (realized earnings less the management forecast amount)/lagged stock price.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The p-values are listed in parentheses under the coefficient.  
The sample for all of the columns includes all available forecasts.  The models are estimated 
using ordinary least squares regressions with robust standard errors clustered by company. 
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Table 14 
Management Earnings Forecast Error and Material Weaknesses in Internal Controls 
Panel B: Control Variables Column 1  Column 2 
Variables Pred 
Absolute 
Forecast Error 
  
Absolute 
Forecast Error 
Intercept  0.018***  0.020*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Financial Exp - -0.001  -0.001 
  (0.192)  (0.196) 
LnAT - -0.001*  -0.001* 
  (0.066)  (0.054) 
ROA - (-0.077)  (-0.081) 
  (0.002)  (0.001) 
Loss + 0.008***  0.008*** 
  (0.021)  (0.026) 
Leverage + 0.000  0.001 
  (0.453)  (0.422) 
EarnVol + -0.005  -0.005 
  (0.623)  (0.637) 
CFOVol + 0.046  0.048 
  (0.117)  (0.109) 
Year Indicators  Included  Included 
Number of observations  16,899  16,899 
Adjusted R2  0.331  0.329 
F-Statistic   7.117***   7.800*** 
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Table 14 
Management Earnings Forecast Error and Material Weaknesses in Internal Controls 
Panel B Cont.: Control Variables Column 1  Column 2 
Variables Pred 
Absolute 
Forecast Error 
  
Absolute 
Forecast Error 
Growth + -0.005  -0.005 
  (0.980)  (0.978) 
IndCon - -0.003  -0.004 
  (0.320)  (0.303) 
Big4 ? 0.004***  0.004*** 
  (0.008)  (0.009) 
LnAnalysts - 0.000  0.000 
  (0.596)  (0.597) 
Std_AF + 0.001  0.001 
  (0.202)  (0.207) 
News - -0.279***  -0.280*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Horizon + 0.000***  0.000*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Litigation - (-0.005)  (-0.005) 
  (0.033)  (0.036) 
High Tech ? -0.002***  -0.001*** 
  (0.483)  (0.518) 
Year Indicators  Included  Included 
Number of observations  16,899  16,899 
Adjusted R2  0.331  0.329 
F-Statistic   7.117***   7.800*** 
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Table 14 
Management Earnings Forecast Error and Material Weaknesses in Internal Controls 
Panel B Cont.: Control Variables Column 3  Column 4 
Variables Pred 
Absolute 
Forecast Error   
Absolute 
Forecast Error 
Intercept  0.018***  0.018*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Financial Exp - -0.001  -0.001 
  (0.196)  (0.191) 
LnAT - -0.001*  -0.001* 
  (0.065)  (0.064) 
ROA - (-0.077)  (-0.078) 
  (0.002)  (0.001) 
Loss + 0.008***  0.008*** 
  (0.021)  (0.025) 
Leverage + 0.000  0.000 
  (0.437)  (0.459) 
EarnVol + -0.004  -0.005 
  (0.614)  (0.626) 
CFOVol + 0.045  0.046 
  (0.119)  (0.114) 
Year Indicators  Included  Included 
Number of observations  16,899  16,899 
Adjusted R2  0.330  0.331 
F-Statistic   7.063***   7.700*** 
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Table 14 
Management Earnings Forecast Error and Material Weaknesses in Internal Controls 
Panel B Cont.: Control Variables Column 3  Column 4 
Variables Pred 
Absolute 
Forecast Error   
Absolute 
Forecast Error 
Growth + -0.005  -0.005 
  (0.979)  (0.979) 
IndCon - -0.003  -0.003 
  (0.324)  (0.317) 
Big4 ? 0.004***  0.004*** 
  (0.009)  (0.010) 
LnAnalysts - 0.000  0.000 
  (0.574)  (0.610) 
Std_AF + 0.001  0.001 
  (0.203)  (0.203) 
News - -0.279***  -0.280*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Horizon + 0.000***  0.000*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Litigation - (-0.005)  (-0.005) 
  (0.032)  (0.032) 
High Tech ? -0.002***  -0.002*** 
  (0.484)  (0.480) 
Year Indicators  Included  Included 
Number of observations  16,899  16,899 
Adjusted R2  0.330  0.331 
F-Statistic   7.063***   7.700*** 
 85 
Appendix The Calculation of Just Beat and Just Beat with DAs 
 
I use earnings management measures similar to those used by Dorantes et al. (2013), and 
therefore I adapt their measures as follows.   
 
I consider a firm to Just Beat if reported earnings per share are between 0.00 and 0.02 greater 
than the management forecast of earnings.   
 
I calculate discretionary accruals using the modified Jones (1991) approach (Dechow et al. 
1995). Following Francis et al. (2008), I estimate the cross-sectional regression model below for 
each of the Fama-French (1997) 48 industry groups.  I require each industry group to have at 
least 20 firms in year t.  The models is as follows: 
𝑇𝐴𝑗,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑗,𝑡−1
= 𝐾1
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑗,𝑡−1
+ 𝐾2
∆𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑗,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑗,𝑡−1
+ 𝐾3
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑗,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑗,𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑗,𝑡 
(7) 
where: 
TAj,t = firm j’s total accruals in year t, measured as (∆CAj,t −∆CLj,t −∆Cashj,t + ∆STDEBTj,t − 
DEPNj,t ).  
∆CAj,t = firm j’s change in current assets between year t-1 and year t; 
∆CLj,t = firm j’s change in current liabilities between year t-1 and year t; 
∆Cashj,t = firm j’s change in cash between year t-1 and year t; 
∆STDEBTj,t = firm j’s change in debt in current liabilities between year t-1 and year t; 
DEPNj,t = firm j’s depreciation and amortization expense in year t. 
Assetj,t−1 = firm j’s total assets at the beginning of year t. 
∆Revj,t = firm j’s change in revenues between year t−1 and year t. 
PPEj,t = firm j’s gross value of property, plant, and equipment in year t. 
 
I then use the industry and year specific parameter estimates obtained from Model (7) to estimate 
firm-specific normal accruals (NA) as a percentage of lagged total assets: 
 
𝑁𝐴𝑗,𝑡 = ?̂?1
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑗,𝑡−1
+ ?̂?2
(∆𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑗,𝑡 − ∆𝐴𝑅𝑗,𝑡)
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑗,𝑡−1
+ ?̂?3
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑗,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑗,𝑡−1
, 
(8) 
Where: 
∆ARj,t = firm j’s change in accounts receivable between year t−1 and year t.  
 
Abnormal discretionary accruals in year t is then calculated as Abnormal DAj,t = TAj,t /Asset j,t−1 
− NAj,t . Following Kothari et al. (2005), I performance match the absolute value of Abnormal 
DAj,t based on firms’ ROA.  I then calculate each firm’s reported earnings before discretionary 
accruals.  A firm is considered to Just Beat with DAs, if their earnings before discretionary 
accruals is below the management forecasted amounts, but the addition of discretionary accruals 
places them in the Just Beat position. 
 
